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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal agencies now regulate the manufacture, design, and labeling of
hundreds of consumer products.' For example, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission promulgates "consumer product safety standards" for a
number of consumer products.2 Likewise, the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 19663 authorizes the National Highway Trans-
portation Safety Administration to develop safety standards for automobiles
and other motor vehicles.4 Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) exercises extensive control over prescription drugs, biologics,
medical devices, and over-the-counter drugs.' The FDA also regulates food
1. See Barbara L. Atwell, ProductsLiability and Preemption:A Judicial Framework,
39 BUFF. L. REv. 181, 181 (1991).
2. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2056,2058 (1988 & Supp. I
1991). These standards may impose requirements concerning design, construction,
packaging, warnings, instructions, or product performance. See 1 Louis R. FRUMER &
MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.08[1][e], at 1-135 to 1-140 (1992). The
Commission also enforces the provisions of the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1191-1204 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991), the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1261-1277, the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261,
1262, 1274, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476
(1988). These are often referred to as "transferred acts" because other federal agencies
administered them before passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act. See Teresa M.
Schwartz & Robert S. Adler, Product Recalls: A Remedy in Need of Repair, 34 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 401, 427 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1988 & Supp. Il 1991).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391, 1392, 1395, 1396 (1988). See generally Steven L.
Holley, Note, The Relationship Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control
of Automobile Design, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 804, 807-13 (1982). The National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act is discussed in greater detail infra part III.B.1.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) exercises similar control over aircraft
performance and design. See 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). FAA
regulations are known as FARs. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1992) (general aviation);
14 C.F.R. pt. 25 (1992) (transport aircraft). See generally Wayne E. Dillingham,
Crashworthiness FARs and the Effect of Compliance in Products Liability Actions
Involving Airplanes, 33 FED'N INS. CoUNs. Q. 55, 63-64 (1982).
5. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & Supp.
1993]
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labeling.6 Finally, Congress has established statutory labeling requirements
for cigarettes, 7 smokeless tobacco products,8 and alcoholic beverages. 9
Many federal product safety statutes expressly prohibit states and
localities from imposing on manufacturers product safety requirements that
differ from those established by federal law. 10 These statutes obviously
preempt nonconforming state and local statutes, ordinances, and administra-
tive regulations. However, it is less clear whether they should be construed
also to preempt state tort-law damage claims against manufacturers whose
products meet applicable federal standards. Despite the numerous product
preemption cases decided over the past five years, federal courts remain
hopelessly divided on this issue."
Part II of this Article analyzes the concept of preemption and discusses
the various preemption categories. Part III surveys the preemption litigation
II 1991). Detailed coverage of FDA authority over prescription drugs, biologics, and
medical devices can be found infra part II.D.1. See generally Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce
F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and Products Liability: Strong
Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 203-42 (1987). For a discussion of FDA
over-the-counter drug regulations see Kenneth C. Baumgartner, A Historical Examination
of the FDA 's Review of the Safety and Effectiveness of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 43 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 463, 465-71 (1988).
6. The FDA exercises this power under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 343 (1988 & Supp. 1111991), and the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988). See generally Charles P. Mitchell, State Regulation and
Federal Preemption of Food Labeling, 45 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 123 (1990); Charles
D. Nyberg, The Need for Uniformity in Food Labeling, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 229
(1985).
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) also exercises some
regulatory authority over food production and marketing. For example, the USDA
operates inspection programs for meat, eggs, and poultry products under the authority
of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1988 & Supp. Ell 1991), the
Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1056, and the Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470. In addition, the USDA has promulgated labeling
standards for each of these products. 21 U.S.C. § 611 (1988) (meat); id. § 1036(b)
(eggs); id. § 457 (poultry products).
7. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
Federal cigarette labeling legislation is discussed infra part IU.A. 1.
8. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§
4401-4408 (1988).
9. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 27 U.S.C. §§ 213-219a (1988). See
generally Carter H. Dukes, Comment, Alcohol Manufacturers and the Duty to Warn:An
Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988,
38 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1206-09 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1334 (1988); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381,
1392(d); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2075; Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C.' § 360k (1988).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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involving cigarettes, airbags, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and medical
.devices. A survey of these cases suggests that most courts ignore important
policy issues by applying a one-dimensional approach to preemption issues.
Part IV describes a model of statutory interpretation based on the
"practical reasoning" approach developed by Eskridge and Frickey.'2 This
model treats statutory interpretation as a dynamic process in which the
interpreter constructs a meaning from considerations of statutory text,
legislative history, and contemporary values and policies. 3 The author of
the present Article concludes that an interpretive approach based on the
Eskridge-Frickey model may lead to better results in product preemption
cases than those achieved by the interpretive approaches currently employed.
In Part V, the Eskridge-Frickey practical reasoning model is applied to
each of the product preemption categories mentioned above. After an
evaluation of text, legislative history, and contemporary values, the author
concludes that the interpretive evidence generally does not support a finding
of preemption in product preemption cases.
H. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land.14
Therefore, Congress may enact laws that supersede state statutes 5 or local
ordinances. 6 State common-law doctrines that conflict with federal law
may also be preempted."' However, the Supreme Court has often refused
12. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation].
13. Id. at 354-62.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
15. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (ruling
that the federal Natural Gas Act preempts state statute purporting to regulate issuance of
long-term securities by natural gas pipeline companies); Michigan Canners & Freezers
Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding state
agricultural marketing statute preempted by federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act).
16. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640
(1973) (holding municipal airport curfew preempted by FAA regulations).
17. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (holding
that Clean Water Act bars private nuisance actions against out-of-state polluters);
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (holding Natural Gas Act
preempts calculation of damages under state contract doctrines); Chicago & N.W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331 (1981) (ruling Interstate
Commerce Act preempts state tort claim based on abandonment of service); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
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to find preemption when Congress has not made its intent to supersede state
law "clear and manifest."18 Furthermore, the Court is reluctant to preempt
state common-law doctrines that represent many generations of judicial
development and concern in areas that traditionally have been reserved to
the states. 19
Preemption can occur in a variety of ways.20 First, Congress can
declare its intention to preempt state law by express language.2' Second,
preemption may be implied when a federal regulatory scheme effectively
occupies the field and leaves no room for state regulation.' Finally, state
law may be preempted when it conflicts with federal regulatory objec-
tives."
A. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute specifically excludes
state regulation in a particular area.24 For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe
270-73 (1974) (noting National Labor Relations Act preempts certain state-law libel
claims); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) (ruling that state
may not enforce licensing requirements that give state board power of review over
federal determination); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959) (ruling National Labor Relations Act preempts state tort-law action against labor
union for engaging in unfair labor practices).
18. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (assuming
historic police powers of the states not superseded by federal acts unless it is the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress).
19. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (noting economic aspects of utilities traditionally
regulated by states); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144
(1963) (recognizing that supervision of foodstuff preparation for market has always been
local concern).
20. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 203-04 (listing ways in which preemption
can occur).
21. Id. at 203.
22. Id. at 203-04.
23. Id. at 204. Some commentators distinguish between express and implied
preemption. The latter category includes preemption based on either occupation of the
field or actual conflict. See Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court and Preemption
Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1233, 1235-36 (1985)
(distinguishing express, conflict, and occupation-of-the-field preemption). However, as
Justice Black observed, no classification scheme is applied consistently: "[Nlone of these
expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard-
stick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
24. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983) (ERISA
benefits); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (union
security agreements); Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1091 (2d Cir.
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Elevator Corp. 2 the Court concluded that preemptive language in the
federal Warehouse Act26 indicated that Congress intended to displace state
jurisdiction over federally licensed warehouse operators.27 Consequently,
the Court quashed proceedings brought against a federal licensee for
violating state laws against rate discrimination."
Regulations promulgated by a federal agency acting within the scope of
its delegated authority may also preempt state law.29 Fidelity Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta involved a conflict between a
regulation adopted by the Federal Loan Bank Board concerning
"due-on-sale" clauses in home mortgage contracts31 and a state common-
law doctrine that limited the use of due-on-sale provisions.32 The Court ob-
served that the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 33 gave the Board broad
authority over federal savings and loan associations. 34 Because the Board
clearly indicated its intent to displace state law concerning due-on-sale
clauses,35 the Court ruled that the Board's regulation expressly preempted
state law.36
B. Federal Occupation of the Field
Federal and state regulatory schemes coexist in many areas. Even when
1977) (municipal air quality standards); cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (literacy tests).
25. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
26. United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, 39 Stat. 486 (1916) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-273 (1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
27. Rice, 331 U.S. at 233-34.
28. Id. at 235-36.
29. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (FCC
cable television regulations); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1962) (treasury
regulations); Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958)
(government procurement regulations); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187,
189-90 (1956) (government procurement regulations).
30. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
31. Federal Savings and Loan System, Reduction and Simplification of Regulations,
44 Fed. Reg. 39,108 (1979) (later codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1980)).
32. The California Supreme Court recognized this common-law doctrine in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). The Wellenkamp
court held that due-on-sale clauses constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation
unless the lender can show that such a clause is necessary to protect against impairment
of its security interest or the risk of default. Id. at 976-77.
33. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470
(1988 & Supp. 11 1991)).
34. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 159-67.
35. Id. at 158.
36. Id. at 170.
1993]
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the federal government plays a dominant role in an area, the states often
retain significant residual power. 37 However, federal involvement in an
area may become so pervasive that it displaces all forms of state regulation
in the same regulatory field.38
1. Dominant Federal Interest
The dominant nature of a federal regulatory interest may justify federal
occupation of a field.39 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon"
provides a good example of this principle. Garmon involved a labor dispute
between a lumber supply company and a number of labor unions. A state
court awarded damages against a union for engaging in unfair labor practic-
es." On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that Congress had placed
primary responsibility for the administration of national labor policy within
a single federal agency "armed with its own procedures, and equipped with
its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience."42 Congress took this
action to ensure the application of uniform procedures and principles of
substantive law.43
The Court noted that the National Labor Relations Act" vests in the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) the power to determine which
union activities are protected and which acts constitute unfair labor
practices.45 If the NLRB determines that a particular activity is either
protected or prohibited, the states are ousted from any jurisdiction over the
37. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1942) (dictum).
38. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1957); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919); Southern Ry.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 447 (1915).
Federal regulatory standards will also preempt state standards if federal standards
are intended to be uniform. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163
(1978); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1961).
39. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 62-63 (1941).
40. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
41. Id. at 237-38.
42. Id. at 242.
43. Id. at 242-43 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91 (1953)).
44. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187
(1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
45. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 241.
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activity.46 More importantly, because the NLRB has primary jurisdiction
over this aspect of labor relations, the Court concluded that state jurisdiction
is also displaced when the NLRB fails to make any determination concerning
union activities.47 Accordingly, the Court held that the state court was
without authority to award damages to the company for injuries caused by
the unions' activities.
2. Pervasive Federal Regulation
A federal regulatory scheme may be so pervasive that it completely
occupies a particular field, thereby excluding even supplementary or parallel
state regulations. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. 49 illustrates this point.
In Schneidewind a public utility company challenged the validity of a
Michigan statute that requires companies to obtain approval of the state
public service commission before issuing long-term securities.5 0 The utility
company claimed that the federal Natural Gas Act' preempted the
Michigan statute.52 The Court agreed that federal regulation of natural gas
distribution is so extensive that state regulation of this field must be preclud-
ed.5
3
The Schneidewind Court observed that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) exercised substantial authority over the financing
activities of natural gas companies to ensure that pipelines and other
facilities were financed in accordance with the public interest. 54 The Court
concluded that, because the Michigan statute constituted an attempt to
regulate natural gas company rates and facilities,55 the provisions invaded
a regulatory area already fully occupied by the FERC. 6 Consequently, the
Court held that the state statute was preempted by the Natural Gas Act.
5
46. Id. at 245.
47. Id. at 245-46. The Court suggested, without deciding, that the states might retain
the power to regulate an activity if the NLRB concludes that the activity is neither
protected nor prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 245.
48. Id. at 246-48.
49. 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
50. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.301 (West 1991).
51. Ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z
(1988)).
52. Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 298. A federal district court upheld the Michigan
statute, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the state statute was preempted.
ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 627 F. Supp. 923, 930 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd,
801 F.2d 228, 233-36 (6th Cir. 1986), aft'd, 485 U.S. 293.
53. Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
54. Id. at 302-03.
55. Id. at 306-09.
56. Id. at 310.
57. Id.
1993]
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However, as Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc.5 8 evidences, pervasive federal regulation, standing alone, does not
always result in preemption of state law. The plaintiff in Hillsborough
County operated a blood plasma center in Tampa, Florida. As a vendor of
blood products, the plaintiff was licensed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).59 After Hillsborough County adopted an ordinance for blood
vendors that was more stringent than the federal regulations, the plaintiff
claimed that the FDA regulations preempted the local law.
The Court disagreed, observing that neither Congress nor the FDA has
expressly preempted state or local regulation of blood plasma collectionW
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that an intent to preempt may
be inferred merely from the comprehensiveness of the FDA's regulations. 61
Because federal agencies typically deal with problems in more detail than
does Congress, the Court believed that inferring preemption from compre-
hensive regulation alone would exclude state regulation whenever a federal
agency stepped into a field-a result that would conflict with states'
rights. 2 Furthermore, the Court noted that agencies are expected to make
clear their intentions about exclusivity.'
C. Actual Conflict Between State and Federal Law
In cases of conflict, federal statutes or regulations will override state
law. A conflict may occur when state law requires action that federal law
forbids, or vice versa.' A conflict may also arise when state law impairs
the exercise of federally created rights.66 Finally, state law may frustrate
58. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
59. Id. at 709-10. The Public Health Service Act authorizes the Secretary to license
vendors of blood products. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1988). The federal statute also requires
that licensed vendors meet safety, purity, and potency standards established by the
Secretary. Id. § 262(d). The FDA, as the delegate of the Secretary of HHS, has promul-
gated extensive regulations concerning donor protection and product labeling. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 640.60-.76 (1992).
60. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714.
61. Id. at 716-18.
62. Id. at 717.
63. Id. at 718.
64. E.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982).
65. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITr. L. REv.
607, 630 (1985) ("A conflict sufficient to invalidate a state regulatory requirement can
exist ... when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law . . .");
William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 626 (1975).
66. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981); Hisquierdo v.
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federal regulatory goals by hindering conduct that federal law intends to
encourage, 67 or by promoting conduct that federal law seeks to discour-
age.
68
1. Impossibility of Compliance with
Both State and Federal Law
McDermott v. Wisconsin69 illustrates a situation in which compliance
with both state and federal law is impossible. In McDermott the Court ruled
that the labeling provisions of the Federal Food and Drug Act70 preempted
a Wisconsin labeling statute.71 The defendant, who sold syrup imported
from another state, showed that syrup which met the federal labeling stand-
ards would be considered mislabeled under a Wisconsin statute. 72 Further-
more, as the defendant asserted, compliance with the state statute would
result in liability under the federal act.73 Because satisfying the require-
ments of both the state and federal statutes was impossible, the Court
invalidated the state statute.74
2. Impairment of Rights Created by Federal Law
A direct conflict may also occur when state law diminishes or interferes
with the exercise of a right created by federal law.75 For example, in
Wissner v. Wissne 76 a married serviceman obtained a National Life
Insurance policy and named his mother as the principal beneficiary. The
serviceman's widow claimed that under California community-property law
she was entitled to a share of the insurance policy proceeds. 77 However,
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585 (1979); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950).
67. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145, 150-54 (1982),
limited by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986); Nash
v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967).
68. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639
(1973).
69. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
70. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
71. McDermott, 228 U.S. at 137.
72. Id. at 126-27.
73. Id. at 132-33.
74. Id. at 137.
75. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585
(1979); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379,404 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663, 670 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
76. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
77. Id. at 657.
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the federal statute provided that the insured had the exclusive right to
designate a beneficiary.78 According to the Court, application of state
community-property law to military insurance policies would diminish the
rights of military policyholders, thereby potentially impairing morale within
the armed services.79 Consequently, the Court held that federal law
controlled the disposition of the insurance proceeds.8"
3. Frustration of Federal Regulatory Objectives
Sometimes provisions of federal law and state law do not openly
conflict, but their regulatory objectives are incompatible nonetheless. 8' For
example, Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing &
Bargaining Board 2 concerned the Michigan Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Act, s" which established a state-administered system under
which growers' associations were organized and certified as exclusive
bargaining agents for all producers of a particular agricultural commodity.
The Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
(MACMA) was accredited as the sole sales and bargaining agent for
asparagus producers in the state."4 A group of asparagus farmers and
processors challenged the Michigan statute because it required nonmember
growers to pay service fees or adhere to contracts negotiated by
MACMA. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions conflicted with the
federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 (AFPA)86 and thus should
be preempted.'
The Court noted that both the AFPA and the Michigan statute were
intended to facilitate collective action among producers and to protect
producers from coercive action by processors.88 However, unlike the state
statute, the federal act also protected individual producers against coercive
action by associations of producers.89 According to the Court, Congress
78. Id. at 658.
79. Id. at 660.
80. Id. at 659.
81. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973).
82. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
83. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 290.701-290.726 (West 1984).
84. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 468.
85. Id.
86. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (1988).
87. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 468.
88. Id. at 464-66.
89. Id. at 464-65. The federal act makes it unlawful for "handlers," defined to include
associations of producers as well as associations of processors, see 7 U.S.C. § 2302(a)
(1988), to "coerce any producer in the exercise of his right to join and belong to or
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enacted the AFPA with the intent to safeguard the right of producers to
choose the method of marketing their products.' On the other hand, the
Michigan statute empowers producers' associations to do precisely what the
federal act forbids them to do.9 ' Consequently, the Court concluded that
the Michigan statute "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"'
Even when state and federal law share the same regulatory goal, state
law may be preempted on actual conflict grounds if it employs means
different from federal law to achieve the same objective. International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette93 is illustrative. In Ouellette property owners on the
Vermont shore of Lake Champlain brought suit against a paper mill located
on the New York side of the lake.94 Alleging that the defendant's discharge
of pollutants into Lake Champlain constituted a nuisance under Vermont
common law, the plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief.95 The
paper mill claimed that the federal Clean Water Act (CWA)96 preempted
the plaintiffs' state-law nuisance action 9 because, as authorized by the
CWA, the mill held a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit that allowed the mill to discharge effluents into the lake. 9
The Court acknowledged that the ultimate goal of both Vermont
nuisance law and the CWA was water pollution control.' However, the
Court warned that state law may still be preempted "if it interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal."" °
In this case, Congress chose the NPDES permit system as the method to
reduce water pollution. The criteria under which the EPA or the source state
issues discharge permits reflects the cost and availability of pollution
technology and the competing needs of public and industrial uses.'0 ' The
refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers." Id. § 2303(a). The
federal act also makes it unlawful for handlers to "coerce or intimidate any producer to
enter into, maintain, breach, cancel, or terminate a membership agreement or marketing
contract with an association of producers or a contract with a handler." Id. § 2303(c).
90. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 470-72.
91. Id. at 477-78.
92. Id. at 478 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
93. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
94. Id. at 483-84.
95. Id. at 484. The plaintiffs sought $20 million in compensatory damages, $100
million in punitive damages, and an injunction to require the defendant to restructure part
of its water treatment system. Id.
96. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. HI 1990).
97. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484.
98. Id. at 489, 490 n.10.
99. Id. at 494.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988) (containing provision limiting
administration of permit system).
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Court explained that the CWA allows a state to impose more stringent
standards, yet limits to the source states and the EPA the right to administer
the permit system.'I The Court further reasoned that the CWA does not
grant the affected state the right to administer the permit system because to
do so would disrupt the balance of interests inherent in a state's policy
decision.' 3 For example, if a New York source were subject to damages
under Vermont nuisance law, the law of Vermont would effectively override
both the permit requirements and the source state's policy choices."t4
Notwithstanding the holdings in Michigan Canners and Ouellette, the
Court has sometimes tolerated a considerable degree of tension between
federal and state regulatory schemes. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 05
the Court upheld a punitive damages award despite the defendant's
contention that such awards would interfere with the ability of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to punish safety violations by a system of
civil fines." ° In the Court's view, Congress had indicated a willingness
to tolerate any tension that might arise between the NRC's system of civil
penalties and the imposition of punitive damages by the states.''
III. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT PRODUCT PREEMPTION CASES
Over the past five years, federal and state courts have considered the
preemption issue in numerous products liability cases. Most of these
decisions have involved either the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-
ing Act,"08 the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(NTMVSA),1" the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), ° the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),"' or
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)" to the FDCA. This
portion of the Article examines each of these statutes and discusses product
preemption cases that have arisen under them.
102. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 495.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
106. Id. at 257.
107. Id. at 256.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991).
110. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
111. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & Supp. m 1991).
112. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified in part as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
360c-3601 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991)).
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A. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
1. Structure and Purpose
In 1964 a committee appointed by the Surgeon General concluded that
smoking was a potential cause of lung cancer, chronic bronchitis, and
emphysema."I The public's response to the report was "immediate and
vocal."" 4 One year later, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act." 5 The Act required all cigarette packages to contain
the following language: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to
Your Health."116 Congress strengthened the required language in 1969'1
and again in 1984.118 The Labeling Act also declared the intent of Con-
gress to establish a comprehensive federal program of cigarette labeling and
advertising related to smoking and health." 9 The program's goals are to
inform the public about the health hazards of smoking, 2 ° to protect
commerce and the national economy to the extent consistent with informing
the public,' and to prevent commerce and the economy from being
"impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling . . .
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health.""
The Act's preemption provision, codified in section 1334, declares:
"No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette
113. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
PUB. No. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 31 (1964).
114. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 622 (lst Cir. 1987), called into
doubt by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
115. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1341 (1988)).
116. Id. § 4, 79 Stat. at 283 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988)).
117. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333-1340 (1988)). The 1969 amendment
to § 1333 required the following statement: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." Id. § 4, 84 Stat. at
88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988)).
118. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333-1341 (1988)). The 1984 amendment
required tobacco manufacturers to place even more explicit warnings on cigarette
packages, advertisements, and billboards. Id. § 4, 98 Stat. at 2201-03 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
120. Id. § 133 1(1).
121. Id. § 1331(2)(A).
122. Id. § 1331(2)(B).
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package."'" Furthermore, section 1334(b) provides: "No requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." 24
Thus, section 1334 expressly prohibits states from requiring additional
health-related statements on cigarette packages and from imposing any
requirement or prohibition concerning the advertising or promotion of
cigarettes with properly labeled packages."5
2. Caselaw prior to Cipollone
In recent years, many plaintiffs have filed lawsuits against cigarette
companies alleging that the companies failed to provide adequate warnings
about the health risks of smoking.1 26 In response, tobacco companies have
123. Id. § 1334(a).
124. Id. § 1334(b).
125. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy,
and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 902 (1988)
[hereinafter Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability]; Leila B. Boulton, Comment,
Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to Cigarette Smoking Injuries,
36 CATH. U. L. REV. 643, 655 (1987).
126. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Stephen v.
American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987), called into doubt by Cipollone,
112 S. Ct. 2608; Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986),
rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608;
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd,
849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608. See
generally Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REv. 853, 864-76 (1992) (discussing the impact of litigation against cigarette
manufacturers). The argument that cigarette manufacturers should be held strictly liable
because they have failed adequately to warn consumers of the risks of smoking takes the
following form: Product sellers have a duty to warn consumers about known risks
associated with the use or consumption of their products. See Richard C. Ausness,
Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should
be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 716-19
(1989-1990) [hereinafter Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products] (discussing the duty to
warn in products liability). Cigarette manufacturers had provided no warnings about the
health effects of smoking until required to do so by statute in 1965. See Donald W.
Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1423, 1429-30 (1980) [hereinafter Garner, Cigarette Dependency]. However, many
of the health risks of smoking were known to medical science and the tobacco industry
prior to that time. See Bruce A. Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should
Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 ARiz. L. REv. 195, 202 (1987) ("Medical studies in the
1950s pointed to the hazards before the famous 1964 Surgeon General's Report which
revealed the ties between smoking and cancer."). Furthermore, the federally mandated
warnings are inadequate when measured against standards applicable to other product
sellers. See Kathleen M. McLeod, Note, The Great American Smokeout: Holding
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argued that such claims are precluded by the Federal Labeling Act. Prior to
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 7 most courts agreed with the tobacco companies," 8 although a
few found in favor of consumers.129
Moreover, until the Cipollone decision, no court had decided a cigarette
case on express preemption grounds. 130 In addition, courts generally
refused to find preemption based on federal occupation of the field.'
Instead, most courts attempted to resolve preemption questions by engaging
in an actual conflict analysis.'1
2
One of the most popular theories provided that holding cigarette
manufacturers liable for inadequate warnings would conflict with federal
regulatory policy by upsetting the Act's "balance" between health concerns
and commercial interests.' Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.14 illustrates
Cigarette ManufacturersLiable for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the Hazards
of Smoking, 27 B.C. L. REv. 1033, 1064 (1986) (claiming cigarette manufacturers'
warnings are "woefully inadequate" when measured against principles of modem tort
law). Finally, cigarette companies have offset the effect of statutory warnings by positive
advertising strategies. See Bryan D. McElvaine, Note, Liability of Cigarette Manufactur-
ers for Smoking Induced Illnesses and Deaths, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 183 (1986) ("The
strong positive images in the advertising overpower and neutralize the dry warnings
which are now required to be placed in the ads."). Therefore, the argument concludes,
cigarette manufacturers should be held strictly liable in tort for failing adequately to warn
consumers about the health risks of smoking.
127. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
128. See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1222 (1st Cir.
1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414,
420-21 (5th Cir. 1989), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608; Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988), called into doubt by
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608; Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir.
1987), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608; Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313;
Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988); Gunsalus v.
Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 659-60 (Minn. 1989); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 578 A.2d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1991);
Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 769 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
129. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1247-51, 1255
(N.J. 1990); Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 517 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
130. See, e.g., Pennington, 876 F.2d at 418; Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234; Palmer, 825
F.2d at 625; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986);
Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1174; Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247; Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 658;
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
131. See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186; Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1176; Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986); Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247.
132. See, e.g., Pennington, 876 F.2d at 421; Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234-35; Palmer,
825 F.2d at 626; Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187; Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659.
133. See, e.g., Pennington, 876 F.2d at 421; Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234-35; Cipollone,
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this approach. Relying on the Labeling Act's declaration of policy, the court
of appeals concluded that the Act was a response to two distinct legislative
concerns: (1) the need to warn consumers about the health risks of smoking;
and (2) the protection of commerce from the effects of "diverse, nonuniform
and confusing" state cigarette labeling regulations."' 5 In the Palmer court's
view, the Act represented a carefully drawn balance between these two
potentially conflicting objectives.' 36 The court further determined that state
tort actions would upset this "carefully wrought balance of national inter-
ests. "1
37
3. The Cipollone Decision
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.'38 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 3 9 as
amended in 1969,1' expressly preempts tort claims against cigarette
manufacturers for improper health warnings with respect to advertising or
promotion." 1 However, the Court also concluded that the amended Act
does not necessarily preempt claims against cigarette manufacturers for
breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. 142
The Cipollone decision marks the culmination of the Cipollone family's
eight-year effort to obtain compensation for the death of Rose Cipollone,
who died of lung cancer in 1984. 143 The complaint alleged that the
respondents failed to provide adequate warnings about the health risks of
smoking, that they expressly warranted their products were not dangerous
to the health of consumers, that they attempted to neutralize the effects of
statutory warnings, that they ignored medical evidence about the dangers of
smoking, and that they conspired to prevent such medical evidence from
789 F.2d at 187; Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 658.
134. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992).
135. Id. at 626.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
139. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1341 (1988)).
140. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333-1340 (1988)).
141. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621-22 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 2622-24.
143. Rose Cipollone and her husband brought suit against respondent tobacco
companies in 1983 to recover damages for her smoking-related injuries. After Rose's
death, her husband filed an amended complaint and continued the lawsuit. When he died,
the Cipollone's son was substituted as the plaintiff both individually and in his capacity
as executor of his parents' estates. Id. at 2613-14.
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reaching the general public.1" The cigarette companies countered by
arguing that the petitioner's claims were preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling Act. 145
On review, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and O'Connor, proposed two rules of statutory construc-
tion. 46 First, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court should not rely on
implied preemption theories when the statute in question contains an express
preemption provision.' This rule assumes that when Congress defines a
specific area as preempted, it impliedly intends to exclude all other areas
from the preemptive reach of the statute. 4 Since the cigarette labeling
statute contains no other preemptive language, Justice Stevens limited the
Court's examination to the statute's preemption provisions.'49
Second, Justice Stevens contended that express preemption provisions
should be interpreted narrowly. 5 He derived this narrow construction, or
144. Id. at 2614. The complaint also contained claims based on a theory of design
defect, but the Court was not presented with any question concerning those claims. Id.
at 2614, 2615 n.6.
145. Id. at 2615. The trial court initially rejected the respondents' preemption defense,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), but this ruling was reversed on appeal, Cipollone, 789 F.2d at
187-88. On remand, the trial court determined that the petitioner's claims were
preempted insofar as they relied on advertising after the effective date of the Act.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D.NJ. 1986). At trial, the
jury found that the respondents had breached both their duty to warn and express
warranties made prior to the effective date of the Act. The jury refused to award any
damages to Rose Cipollone's estate, concluding that she voluntarily and unreasonably
encountered a known danger by smoking cigarettes. However, the jury did award
$400,000 to her husband's estate as compensation for losses caused by the respondents'
conduct. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
112 S. Ct. 2608. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
ruling on preemption, but ordered a new trial on other grounds. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at
582-83. The United States Supreme Court then granted a petition for certiorari. Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
146. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, concurred in this part
of the Court's analysis. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 2618.
148. Id. Justice Blackmun agreed that the Court should resort to implied preemption
only when Congress is silent about the preemptive scope of the statute. Id. at 2625
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part). On the other hand, Justice Scalia maintained that this approach would be
appropriate when occupation of the field was alleged, but that it should not be used in
conflict cases. Id. at 2633 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
149. Id. at 2618.
150. Id. Justice Scalia, however, argued that the Court should interpret Congress's
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"clear meaning," rule from the Court's longstanding presumption against
preemption of state police-power regulations.'' Accordingly, he declared
that the 1965 Act's preemption provision, section 5(b), did not bar state-law
damage claims against cigarette companies. 52
Justice Stevens determined, however, that the reach of the 1969 Act's
preemption provision was much broader than that of the 1965 Act's
preemption provision.'53 As the Court observed, section 5(b) of the 1969
Act expressly prohibits any "'requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health. . . imposed under State law with respect to . . .advertising or
promotion.'""i" Applying this analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that the
duty to warn is "a state law 'requirement . . .with respect to . . .
advertising or promotion'";'55 therefore, claims based on that duty are
preempted to the extent that they penalize the respondents for failing to
provide additional or more specific warnings than those required by the
federal statute. 
56
However, Justice Stevens found that Cipollone's claims for breach of
express warranty are not preempted by the Act.'57 The petitioner argued
that the respondents made express warranties when they suggested in their
advertising that cigarette smoking was safe. 15 Justice Stevens reasoned
that the respondents' duty under express warranty arose from the terms of
the warranty itself, not from some independent state-law requirement or
prohibition related to health and smoking."' Therefore, he concluded that
the petitioner could sue for breach of express warranty even if the warranty
was communicated by the respondents' advertising or promotional activi-
ties.'60
Justice Stevens also upheld the petitioner's claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. 6' The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely
represented in their advertising that smoking was safe, and that they
preemption decrees "neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their apparent
meaning." Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
151. Id. at 2618.
152. Id. at 2619.
153. Id. at 2619-21 (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at 2621 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2621-22. Significantly, Justice Stevens suggested that claims based on
failure to discover and disclose risks because of inadequate testing or research would not
be preempted because they are not directly related to advertising or promotional
activities. Id.
157. Id. at 2622-23.
158. Id. at 2622.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2622-23.
161. Id. at 2624.
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fraudulently concealed evidence about the health risks of smoking. 62
According to Justice Stevens, section 5(b) preempts only state requirements
with respect to advertising or promotion, but does not bar claims based on
failure to disclose material facts through other forms of communication. 63
Furthermore, claims arising from false or misleading statements in the
respondents' advertising are not preempted because these claims are based
not on a duty relating to smoking and health, but rather on a broader duty
not to deceive.164
Using the same analysis, Justice Stevens also upheld Cipollone's claim
of conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts concerning the health
risks of smoking. 65 Justice Stevens reasoned that this claim was based on
a general duty "not to conspire to commit fraud," instead of on a specific
state requirement relating to health warnings.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, maintained
that none of Cipollone's claims should be preempted by section 5(b) of the
1969 Act. 67 Justice Blackmun argued that the phrase "requirement or
prohibition imposed under State law" was ambiguous. He observed that the
dictionary defimitions of "requirement" and "prohibition" suggest "specific
actions mandated or disallowed by a formal governing authority," but do not
necessarily include duties imposed by common-law doctrines. 68 According
to Justice Blackmun, common-law damage awards do not have the same
impact on product manufacturers as do statutory or administrative regula-
tions. 16 9 A product manufacturer can respond to its common-law duty to
warn in a variety of ways, including payment of damage awards. 7 0 In
addition, Justice Blackmun noted that tort law differs from statutes or
administrative regulations because tort law is primarily concerned with
compensating injured parties.'
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, asserted that the 1965 Act
preempted Cipollone's failure-to-warn claims -and the 1969 Act preempted
all of Cipollone's common-law claims. 2 Justice Scalia argued that both
162. Id. at 2623-24. The petitioner also maintained that the respondents' advertising
has neutralized the effect of federally mandated health warnings. Justice Stevens ruled
that this claim was preempted because it was nothing more than the converse of
Cipollone's preempted failure to warn claim. Id. at 2623.
163. Id. at 2623.
164. Id. at 2624.
165. Id. at 2624-25.
166. Id. at 2624.
167. Id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 2627.
169. Id. at 2627-28.
170. Id. at 2628.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2632-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in
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Acts expressly preempt any legal rule that imposes liability upon cigarette
companies based on the failure to include, in their advertising or promo-
tional material, information concerning the health risks of smoking.'
Under this analysis, the petitioner's failure-to-warn claim is obviously
preempted. 74 In addition, Justice Scalia reasoned that Cipollone's express
warranty claim should be preempted because background legal principles,
not voluntary actions by the respondents, impose liability for promises or
representations about smoking and health." This reasoning also led
Justice Scalia to conclude that Cipollone's fraudulent misrepresentation
claims should also be preempted.' According to Justice Scalia, there is
no difference between an affirmative duty to warn about a smoking-related
health risk and a duty not to deceive the public about the existence of such
a risk.
B. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
1. Structure and Purpose
Motor vehicle design is regulated under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.171 The Act directs the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to promulgate federal motor vehicle safety standards.'7 This
authority has been delegated to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). ' Safety standards address vehicle defects that
cause accidents, and may also apply to design characteristics that aggravate
occupants' injuries from automobile accidents. 8 ' Federal standards
part).
173. Id. at 2635.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2636-37.
177. Id. at 2636.
178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1988 & Supp. Ell 1991).
179. Id. § 1392.
180. See 49 U.S.C. § 105(d) (1988). The NHTSA also engages in the acquisition,
analysis, and reporting of accident data through the Fatal Accident Reporting System
(FARS), the National Accident Sampling System (NASS), and special studies. See Cary
S. Sklaren, The Effect of Current Regulations and Enforcement Policy on Products
Liability in the Motor Vehicle Industry, 21 TORT & INs. L.J. 464, 474 (1986).
181. Each safety standard must protect the public "against unreasonable risk of
accidents occurring as a result of the design, construction or performance of motor
vehicles and . . . unreasonable risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents
do occur." 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1988). See generally Michael D. Hitt, Comment,
Occupant Protection in Automobiles-Air Bags and Other Passive Restraints: The State
of the Art, the Federal Standard, and Beyond, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 635, 643 (1978)
(noting that the automobile safety standard is one of "reasonable safety").
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currently govern safety glass, door strength and latch design, fuel system
integrity, occupant protection, and numerous other areas. 1' 2
The Act contains a preemption provision that prohibits nonidentical
state regulations when a federal standard addresses the same aspect of
performance."s3 However, states may enforce safety standards that are
identical to federal standards and may also regulate aspects of performance
that federal safety standards do not specifically cover." Finally, the Act
contains a "savings clause" that purports to preserve common-law remedies
against automobile manufacturers. I8 5
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 specifies
equipment requirements for active and passive restraint systems."8 6 When
FMVSS 208 was first promulgated in 1967, it merely required automakers
182. Stephen J. Werber, The Products Liability Revolution-Proposals for Continued
Legislative Responses in the Automotive Industry, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 46 (1982-
1983).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988). This subsection provides in part:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.
Id.
184. Id. The subsection continues:
Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from
enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government
or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from estab-
lishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle
equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher
standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise
applicable Federal standard.
Id.
185. Id. § 1397(k). This subsection of the Act states: "Compliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law." Id.
186. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1991). For a discussion of the history and substance of
FMVSS 208, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 34-38 (1983); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 822-23 (1lth
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865
F.2d 395, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General
Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1111-12 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd, 865 F.2d 395 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union,
A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 316-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). See generally Keith C. Miller,
Deflating the Airbag Pre-Emption Controversy, 37 EMORY L.J. 897, 901-909 (1988);
Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims: Preemption and
Reciprocal Comity, 61 NomE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1986).
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to install seat belts in their motor vehicles." 8 In 1972, NHTSA issued a
new version of FMVSS 208 that required all vehicles produced after August
15, 1975 to have full passive restraint protection for front-seat occu-
pants. "'88 Since 1972, FMVSS 208 has undergone a number of transforma-
tions. 89 Presently, the regulation allows manufacturers to comply by
meeting one of three options: (1) a passive restraint system, such as airbags,
in conjunction with seatbelts; (2) a combination of passive restraints,
detachable shoulder harnesses, lap belts, and warning systems; or (3) a
combination of nondetachable shoulder harnesses, lap belts, and warning
systems. '10
In recent years, numerous injured parties have brought design defect
claims against automobile manufacturers who failed to equip their vehicles
with airbags. 9 For the most part, however, courts have ruled against
plaintiffs on preemption grounds."9
187. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2415, at 2415-16 (1967).
188. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972). The
regulations also required automobiles produced between 1973 and 1975 to be equipped
with either passive restraints or a seat belt system with ignition interlock and belt
warning. Id. However, in 1974 Congress revoked, all occupant restraint system
requirements other than a belt system. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, sec. 109, § 125(b), 88 Stat. 1470, 1482 (1974) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(a)-(b) (1988)). Congress also declared that any safety standard
requiring an occupant restraint system other than a belt system must be submitted to
Congress for possible legislative veto. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b)(3) (1988).
189. A 1975 proposed amendment extended the requirement date for full passive
restraint protection to 1976. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,217, at 16,217-18 (1975). Thereafter,
Secretary William Coleman issued a new rule providing for a seat belt option. 41 Fed.
Reg. 24,070, at 24,076-77 (1976). In 1977 Secretary Brock Adams promulgated new
rules that required passive restraints in 1984 models. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289, at 34,296-97
(1977). In 1981, Secretary Andrew Lewis rescinded these rules. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419,
at 53,427 (1981). The Supreme Court held this action invalid. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 & n.21 (1983). In 1984,
Secretary Elizabeth Dole issued yet another version of FMVSS 208.49 Fed. Reg. 28,962
(1984). Secretary Dole ordered a three-year phase-in of passive restraints to begin in
September 1986. This phase-in would be revoked, however, if a sufficient number of
states passed mandatory seat belt use laws by 1989. Id. at 28,998.
190. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.2.1 to S4.1.2.3 (1991).
191. Injured parties have generally relied on the "crashworthiness" doctrine. This
doctrine requires automakers to design vehicles that provide reasonable protection against
injuries that may occur during a collision. For a discussion of the crashworthiness
doctrine, see Werber, supra note 182, at 3-5; Ellen L. Theroff, Note, Preemption of
Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot Air?, 76 VA. L. REV. 577, 587-88 (1990).
192. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 714 F. Supp.
739 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990).
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2. Express Preemption
A few courts have held that the NTMVSA's preemption section
expressly preempts tort claims based on failure to provide airbags. 19 For
example, in Vanover v. Ford Motor Co.194 the court ruled that a damage
award would effectively impose a safety standard on a manufacturer since
an award would penalize the manufacturer for failing to install airbags.'g
The court reasoned that section 1392(d) expressly preempts tort claims
because the standard imposed by state common-law is inconsistent with the
federal standard. 196
On the other hand, most courts have declined to find express preemp-
tion in airbag cases.197 These courts have based their conclusions either on
the absence of any specific reference to common-law claims in the Act's
preemption section,91s or on the Act's savings clause that expressly
preserves common-law claims.1"
3. Occupation of the Field
Although the federal government is primarily responsible for regulating
automobile safety, Congress has given some regulatory authority to the
states. For example, states may enforce safety standards that are identical
to federal standards.' ° States may also establish more stringent standards
for their own procurement purposes.201 Moreover, the Act encourages
193. See, e.g., Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Mo.
1986); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Md. 1986); Wickstrom v.
Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1236 (1988).
194. 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
195. Id. at 1096.
196. Id. at 1096-97.
197. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823-25 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d
395, 401-02 (Ist Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kolbeck v. General
Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 536-38 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Garrett v. Ford Motor Co.,
684 F. Supp. 407, 409 (D. Md. 1987).
198. See, e.g., Taylor, 875 F.2d at 824; Kolbeck, 702 F. Supp. at 538; Garrett, 684
F. Supp. at 410.
199. See, e.g., Kolbeck, 702 F. Supp. at 538; Garrett, 684 F. Supp. at 409. However,
several courts have ruled that the savings clause preserves common-law claims only when
no federal safety standard is involved. E.g., Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp.
761, 764 (D. Md. 1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236 (1988).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
201. Id.
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states to enforce inspection programs for used cars. 2" These provisions
militate against any preemption argument based on federal occupation of the
entire field of motor vehicle safety. 3 Consequently, courts have firmly
rejected the occupation-of-the-field theory in this area.2' 4
4. Actual Conflict
State law may be preempted on actual conflict grounds when compli-
ance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' Automobile manufacturers cannot claim "physical impossibil-
ity" as a basis for federal preemption because they can install airbags in
their vehicles and still comply with the requirements of FMVSS 208.206
Accordingly, courts have tended to focus on whether damage awards
frustrate the Act's regulatory purpose.
In automobile safety cases, as in the cigarette cases, courts have
disagreed about the coercive effect of damage awards. Some courts have
reasoned that tort liability does not compel carmakers to install airbags
because carmakers can accept the risk of having to pay damages instead of
changing their conduct.' Hence, a number of courts have concluded that
damage awards do not constitute a form of state regulation." 8 Other
courts, however, have held that damage awards are inherently coercive and
thus would have a regulatory effect on automobile manufacturers. 9
A number of courts have also invoked the reasoning of International
202. Id. § 1397(b)(1).
203. See Theroff, supra note 191, at 615 ("I]t is clear that Congress did not intend
to establish a federal presence in the field of motor vehicle safety sufficient to eliminate
all corresponding state action.").
204. See Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407, 409 (D. Md. 1987); see also
Miller, supra note 186, at 911 ("[Tihe language of section 1392(d) demonstrates that
Congress did not mean to occupy the field of automobile safety completely.").
205. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
206. See Miller, supra note 186, at 914; Theroff, supra note 191, at 611-12.
207. See, e.g., Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (D.N.M. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 943
(Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. See, e.g., Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 424 (1st Cir. 1988)
(Selya, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto
Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
209. E.g., Wood, 865 F.2d at 410; Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp.
532, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Wattelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1039, 1041
(D. Mont. 1987).
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Paper Co. v. Ouelette1 ° to conclude that common-law damage claims
interfere with the method that Congress and the Department of Transpor-
tation have chosen to regulate motor vehicle design.2" As discussed
previously, carmakers can satisfy the requirements of FMVSS 208 by
employing any one of three passenger restraint systems.2" 2 According to
some courts, imposing tort liability on automakers who fail to install airbags
would frustrate the Act's regulatory policy by removing two of the three
options FMVSS 208 allows.213
C. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
1. Structure and Purpose
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)2 a
authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate most
aspects of the development, manufacture, sale, and use of pesticides. 25
All pesticides must be registered with the EPA before they are distributed
for sale in the United States. 26 To register a pesticide under FIFRA, the
manufacturer must submit to the EPA the pesticide's names, labeling
information, and directions for use. The EPA then determines what
supporting data will be required. 27 Supporting data may include chemical
composition, physical and chemical characteristics, and studies of tetragen-
icity, mutagenicity, and effects on metabolism. 218 The EPA will approve
a registration request only if the product can perform its intended function
without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. 219
210. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
211. See, e.g., Wood, 865 F.2d at 408; Kolbeck, 702 F. Supp. at 541.
212. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.2.1 to S4.1.2.3 (1991), discussed supra text
accompanying note 190. The apparent purpose of this provision is to encourage
manufacturers to develop new and more effective passenger restraint systems instead of
limiting carmakers to a single restraint technology. See Miller, supra note 186, at 936;
Wilton, supra note 186, at 27.
213. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (1lth Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S 1065 (1990); Kolbeck, 702 F. Supp. at 541; Wickstrom v.
Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1236 (1988).
214. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
215. See John G. Gleeson & Larry W. Davidson, Federal Pre-emption as a Defense
in Pesticide Poisoning Litigation, 56 DEF. COuNS. J. 318 (1989).
216. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. 1II 1991).
217. 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.20-158.740 (1992).
218. Id. §§ 158.150, 158.202 (1992). Also, the EPA may independently collect
information about the proposed pesticide. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(2)(A), 136s.
219. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
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The EPA also exercises strict control over product labeling. When a
pesticide is registered, the manufacturer must submit the proposed label to
the EPA for approval.' The Act requires the label to be "adequate to
protect health and the environment"" and "likely to be read and under-
stood. "' The EPA also determines whether the product will be classified
for general use, restricted use, or both.' "General use pesticides" are
less hazardous and are ordinarily available for public use. 4 "Restricted
use pesticides" are those which, without additional regulatory restrictions,
"may generally cause ... unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,
including injury to the applicator."'s Restricted use pesticides may only
be used under the direct supervision of a "Certified Applicator."'6
The states are authorized to regulate the sale and use of pesticides to the
extent that such regulation does not conflict with FIFRA.22 ' However,
Congress has granted to the EPA exclusive control over labeling and
packaging.228 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether FIFRA's preemptive
language also precludes damage awards against pesticide manufacturers for
failure to provide adequate warnings."9 A number of courts have allowed
injured parties to allege that manufacturers breached their duty to warn.210
220. Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 406 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
221. 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(G) (1988).
222. Id. § 136(q)(1)(E). Regulations promulgated under FIFRA not only require
particular warning language, 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(1) (1992), but also specify the type
size, color, and placement of the warning, id. § 156.10(a)(2), (4).
223. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d).
224. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(B).
225. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C).
226. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).
227. Id. § 136v(a) ("A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered
pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not
permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.").
228. See id. § 136v(b) ("Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter.").
229. Several courts have concluded that state-law claims based on product defects
other than labeling are not preempted. See, e.g., Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F.
Supp. 799, 812 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283,
1289 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
230. E.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.
Mont. 1992); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Montana
Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Mont. 1991);
Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1506-09 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v.
Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Cox v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem.
Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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However, other courts have concluded that FIFRA preempts such
claims.' 3 '
2. Express Preemption
Most courts have rejected the argument that FIFRA expressly preempts
common-law claims.3 2 This reluctance to find express preemption is
based, at least in part, on the failure of Congress to mention common-law
damage awards in the Act's preemption section."23 However, the court in
Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co.234 apparently concluded that the language
in FIFRA's preemption section manifests an express intent to exclude all
forms of state regulation over labeling, including common-law damage
awards.2'2
3. Occupation of the Field
Although FIFRA gives the EPA extensive regulatory control over
pesticides,"26 few courts have concluded that this authority occupies the
entire field. 7 Most courts have refused to preempt on occupation-of-the-
field grounds because section 136v(a) reserves a certain amount of
231. E.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1303 (4th Cir. 1992);
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 164
(10th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co.,
113 S. Ct. 314 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas V. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); Hurt v.
Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559-60 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Herr v. Carolina Log
Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 961 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 807;
Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1289; Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 407-08
(E.D. Mich. 1987); Begley v. Truly Nolan Exterminating, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1038, 1039
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Nev. 1992).
232. See, e.g., Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542; Montana Pole, 775 F. Supp. at 1343;
Riden, 763 F. Supp. at 1505; Evenson, 760 F. Supp. at 1348; Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at
1286-87; Roberts, 702 F. Supp. at 197; Cox, 704 F. Supp. at 87; Davidson, 834 P.2d
at 934.
233. Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1286-87. At least one court seems to have excluded
express preemption on the theory that damage awards do not constitute "requirements for
labeling" and, therefore, do not fall within the literal language of § 136v(b). See
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541.
234. 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
235. Id. at 805.
236. See Gleeson & Davidson, supra note 215, at 318 (stating FIFRA totally and
strictly controls all aspects of pesticide development, manufacture, sales, and use).
237. E.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); Young v. American
Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
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regulatory power to the states.Y
One federal circuit court, however, has found preemption based on
occupation of the field. Papas v. Upjohn Co. 39 concerned a failure-to-
warn claim against two pesticide manufacturers. The lower court granted the
defendants partial summary judgment on preemption grounds, and the
plaintiff appealed. In affirming the lower court's ruling, the federal appellate
court declared that FIFRA gives the EPA the exclusive right to regulate
pesticide labels.240 After reviewing the labeling regulations adopted by the
EPA, the court concluded that "the federal government has occupied the
entire field of labeling regulation, leaving no room for the states to supple-
ment federal law, even by means of state common law tort actions."
241
However, the Supreme Court vacated the Papas ruling242 in light of
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
243
4. Actual Conflict
As in the cigarette and airbag cases, courts in pesticide cases have
resolved preemption issues based on whether damage awards frustrate the
regulatory objectives of federal law. Again, the courts have devoted much
attention to the question of whether damage awards are sufficiently coercive
to serve as a surrogate for direct state regulation of product labeling.
Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.244 is the leading case on this issue.
In Ferebee an agricultural worker brought suit against a herbicide manufac-
238. See Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (4th Cir. 1992);
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Mo. 1990);
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990);
Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Roberts v.
Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also S. REP. No. 838,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4021 ("General-
ly, the intent of the provision is to leave to the States the authority to impose stricter
regulation on pesticides uses than that required under the Act."). One court has
apparently concluded that Congress did not occupy the field, at least with respect to
labeling, because FIFRA allows manufacturers to submit proposed labels for EPA
approval. See Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
239. 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon
Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); see also Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d
931, 935-36 (Nev. 1992) (ruling federal government has completely preempted the field
of pesticide labeling regulation).
240. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1024.
241. Id. at 1025.
242. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), vacating Papas v. Upjohn Co.,
926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
243. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
244. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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turer, alleging injury from long-term occupational exposure to paraquat-
The plaintiff claimed that the labeling on the defendant's product was
defective because it failed to warn that long-term exposure to paraquat could
cause serious lung disease.246 The defendant contended that FIFRA
preempts damage claims based on inadequate product labeling. The
defendant argued that section 136v(b) preempts state regulation of product
labeling and that damage awards based on label inadequacy have a
regulatory aim that is necessarily preempted.247
The court refused, however, to characterize damage awards as purely
regulatory, noting that the manufacturer could elect to retain the existing
label and simply pay damages.248 The court also recognized that tort
recovery may promote regulatory aims by inducing manufacturers to request
the EPA to allow more detailed labeling.249 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that damage awards do not frustrate federal regulatory objectives
because Congress intended EPA labeling standards to prescribe a floor on
acceptable conduct, not a ceiling."° The Ferebee court concluded that
absent a clear expression of congressional intent, federal courts should not
deprive the states of the power to compensate injured citizens. 1
Other federal courts have agreed with Ferebee that damage awards are
not regulatory because product manufacturers can choose to pay damages
instead of changing product labeling. 2 However, a number of other
courts have concluded that damage awards are coercive and, therefore,
conflict with FIFRA.153 Judicial support also exists for the Ferebee court's
245. Id. at 1531-32.
246. Id. at 1532.
247. Id. at 1540.
248. Id. at 1541.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1543.
251. Id.
252. E.g., Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339,
1345 (D. Mont. 1991); Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (W.D. Mo.
1991); Evensonv. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind.
1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v.
Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
253. E.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid, 970 F.2d 1301, 1307 (4th Cir. 1992);
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 162-
63 (10th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem.
Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025-26 (1lth Cir.
1991) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992);
Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Herr v. Carolina
Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 961 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681
F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62,
65-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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conclusion that EPA labeling standards are merely minimum standards;1 4
although some courts have disagreed with Ferebee and characterized EPA
standards as uniform, rather than minimum, standards. 3"
D. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
1. Structure and Purpose
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 1
6
and certain provisions of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)," 7 the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the manufacture and
marketing of virtually all pharmaceutical products." The FDA requires
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products to produce, package, and store all
products in conformity with Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP)." 59
Pharmaceutical products that do not comply with GMP are considered
"adulterated."2" ° The FDA also regulates drug labeling and specifies the
information that must be supplied on package inserts and other labeling.
26'
If a manufacturer fails to comply with FDA labeling requirements, its
product will be deemed misbranded.262
In addition, the FDA must license any new drug before the drug is
marketed. 63 The approval process begins with the submission of an
Investigational New Drug (IND) application.2" If the IND is approved,
254. E.g., Riden, 763 F. Supp. at 1508; Cox, 704 F. Supp. at 86-87; Roberts, 702 F.
Supp. at 197.
255. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte, 959 F.2d at 162; Papas, 926 F.2d at 1025-26; Fisher,
716 F. Supp. at 1289; Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 407.
256. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & Supp. 1i 1991).
257. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b, 262 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
258. See generally Ann N. James, Comment, Warnings and the Pharmaceutical
Companies: Legal Status of the Package Insert, 16 Hous. L. Rv. 140, 143 (1978)
(stating that the entire industrial process of drug manufacture and sale is closely regulated
by the FDA).
259. Some of the FDA regulations on GMP are codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1992)
(drugs) and 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (1992) (medical devices). Among the topics addressed in
these standards are building design and construction, maintenance and sanitation,
personnel qualifications, and quality control. Pennington P. Landen, Federal Preemption
and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 102
(1988).
260. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1)(B) (1988).
261. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56-201.57 (1992).
262. Landen, supra note 259, at 104.
263. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). The definition of "new drug" is provided in 21 C.F.R. §
310.3(h) (1992). In general, the FDA regulating process for biologics is similar to that
for chemical drugs. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 5, at 205-06.
264. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i). See generally Note, A Question of Competence: The
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the manufacturer may gather data needed for the formal application, a New
Drug Application (NDA).2" The NDA is a comprehensive compilation of
all information known about the drug at the time of the application.2"
Experts then review the NDA to determine whether the evidence shows the
drug to be safe and effective for its intended purpose.267 Only after this
review process is completed will the FDA license a new drug for market-
ing.2 68
2. Pharmaceutical Products in General
Despite the comprehensiveness of federal regulation in the drug
industry, courts have resisted preemption arguments made by manufacturers
of pharmaceutical products. 269 MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.27 illustrates this resistance. In MacDonald, a consumer sued a
manufacturer of oral contraceptives, alleging that the package insert failed
to provide an adequate warning of the risk of stroke associated with the
drug's use.271 The manufacturer claimed that its warning complied with
FDA labeling requirements and that those requirements preempted any duty
to warn under state tort law.272 The court declared, however, that "[t]he
regulatory history of the FDA requirements belies any objective to cloak
them with preemptive effect."273 The court then concluded that the
adequacy of the warning was a question of fact for the jury. 274 Most courts
Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REv. 773,776 (1990)
("The IND contains information about the proposed drug's chemistry, manufacturing,
pharmacology, and toxicology.").
265. Note, supra note 264, at 776. The NDA is required by 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
266. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). "The NDA must include detailed reports of all animal
studies and clinical testing done with the drug, reports of any adverse reactions, and any
other pertinent information from worldwide scientific literature." Landen, supra note
259, at 100; see also John F. Del Giorno, Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescription
Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing on State Court Jury
Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 629, 645 (1989) ("[Ihe
current FDA regulations for New Drug Applications ... express the most stringent
standards of pharmacological investigation in use today.").
267. Landen, supra note 259, at 100.
268. See generally Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of
Federal and State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 171, 180-85
(1986) (discussing evidence reliability, and safety as a function of risk and utility).
269. See Del Giorno, supra note 266, at 640-44 (discussing courts' reasons for
rejecting federal preemption).
270. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
271. Id. at 67-68. However, the warning did warn of "'abnormal blood clotting which
can be fatal.'" Id. at 66 (quoting drug warning).
272. Id. at 70.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 71-72. Some commentators have criticized the MacDonald decision. E.g.,
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have employed the same approach used by the MacDonald court.275
3. DPT Vaccine
During the 1980s, numerous injured parties brought lawsuits against
manufacturers of the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine. 76
Plaintiffs' claims were based on both inadequate warning and defective
design theories.' Vaccine manufacturers maintained that federal law
preempts common-law damage awards. 8 However, the courts have
generally rejected the manufacturers' arguments.
a. Inadequate Warning Claims
In many cases, plaintiffs have alleged that manufacturers failed to
provide adequate information about the risks of DPT vaccine, 279 or that
manufacturers failed to communicate this information to vaccine recipi-
ents."' Although courts have rejected some of these claims on the mer-
its," t they have generally declined to find preemption on grounds of either
express preemption,au occupation of the field,D or actual conflict.2"
Walsh & Klein, supra note 268, at 192 (stating thatMacDonald conflicts with the federal
regulatory scheme).
275. See, e.g., Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658-
59 (1st Cir. 1981); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir.
1975); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 592 A.2d 1176, 1196-97 (N.J. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027
(1992); cf Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383 (D. Md. 1975),
aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977).
276. See Okianer C. Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the
Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1988); Linda A.
Willett, Note, DPT Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Federal Preemption Reconsidered,
41 RuTGERS L. REV. 373, 382 (1988).
277. Dark, supra note 276, at 820.
278. See Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the
Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. Rv. 655, 656 (1989).
279. E.g., Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1115 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F.
Supp. 700, 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Martinkovic ex rel. Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Graham ex rel. Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F.
Supp. 1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987).
280. E.g., McMillan ex rel. Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674 F. Supp. 530,535 (E.D.N.C.
1987); Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 1003 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd,
851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
281. E.g., Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 708; Foyle, 674 F. Supp. at 536; White v. Wyeth
Lab., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ohio 1988).
282. See, e.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111; Foyle, 674 F. Supp. at 532; Wack v. Lederle
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Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories (Hurley 1) represents an exception
to this trend. The plaintiff in Hurley I sued Lederle, alleging that the
product was defectively designed and that the manufacturer had failed to
provide an adequate warning about the possibility of an adverse reaction
from whole-cell pertussis vaccine." 6 The district court considered four
factors to determine whether to imply preemption in a regulatory field: (1)
the intent of Congress as revealed by the statute's text or legislative history;
(2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; (3) whether the
subject matter of the regulation demands exclusive federal regulation to
achieve uniformity; and (4) whether state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal objectives.
287
The court concluded that the first factor was not present. 28 Regarding
the second factor, the Hurley I court did find that the comprehensiveness of
FDA regulation over DPT labeling evidenced an intent to occupy the field,
thereby precluding state regulation.8 9 The court observed that the FDA
strictly controls the contents and wording of product inserts, including
information about potential adverse reactions. Furthermore, once the FDA
approves particular language, the manufacturer cannot change the language
without the FDA's permission.2'
Although in Hurley I the court found preemption on the basis of the
second factor, it evaluated DPT labeling in light of the remaining factors as
well. Examining the third factor, the court concluded that a dominant federal
interest exists with respect to drug labeling because of the need to achieve
uniformity in this area.291 The court supported this conclusion by quoting
from an FDA regulation that declared the "'FDA has a well established
policy of promoting uniformity in the area of labeling.' "292
The court also ruled that the fourth factor supported a finding of
Lab., 666 F. Supp. 123, 127 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
283. See, e.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112; Foyle, 674 F. Supp. at 533; Graham, 666
F. Supp. at 1491-93; Martinkovic, 669 F. Supp. at 214.
284. See, e.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1113-14; Martinkovic, 669 F. Supp. at 215.
285. 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded
by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
286. Id. at 994-95.
287. Id. at 997. The court derived this four-factor test from Northern States Power
Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1143-47 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972),
and KVUE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp., 709 F.2d 922, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1983),
aff'd sub nom. Texas v. KVUE-TV, Inc., 465 U.S. 1092 (1984).
288. Hurley I, 651 F. Supp. at 998.
289. Id. at 999.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 51,403 (1985)).
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preemption.29 According to the court, the FDA had an express regulatory
policy of restricting material on package inserts, including statements about
adverse effects, to information that was supported by clear scientific evi-
dence.2 4 Therefore, the FDA disapproved of warning about risks that
were still in dispute within the scientific community. 295 The court noted
that the FDA had examined the risk of encephalopathy, the plaintiff's injury,
and had specifically addressed this risk by requiring certain statements about
it in DPT labeling. 29 Permitting a state to determine that an
FDA-mandated warning was inadequate "would obviously undermine or
overrule the FDA's duty to establish a uniform nation-wide system of useful
product information as to the drug's effectiveness and its risks. "2I
In Hurley 119 8 the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision
with respect to labeling." Relying on the reasoning in Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.," the court in Hurley
I declared that FDA regulations do not ordinarily preempt stricter state-law
standards.3"' The court also rejected the claim that the PHSA and its
regulations are pervasive enough to exclude state regulation."° Finally, the
court concluded that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986,303 passed after the case was filed, indicated that Congress did not
intend to preempt common-law claims.3 4
b. Design Defect Claims
The design defect claims are based on the assumption that whole-cell
293. Id. at 999-1000.
294. Id. at 1000 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 37,441 (1979)).
295. Id. (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 33,230, at 33,230-32 (1974)).
296. Id. at 1001.
297. Id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 37,436. The court in Hurley I also rejected the
conventional view that FDA labeling regulations imposed only minimum requirements
on drug manufacturers. Instead, the court declared that FDA regulations should be
treated as exclusive, thus preempting any inadequate-warning claim against a drug
manufacturer when the manufacturer has complied with FDA labeling requirements. See
id.
298. Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173
(5th Cir. 1988).
299. Id. at 1543.
300. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
301. Hurley 11, 851 F.2d at 1539-40.
302. Id. at 1540.
303. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
304. Hurley II, 851 F.2d at 1540-41. However, the court suggested that compliance
with FDA-approved labeling would immunize drug manufacturers from tort liability if
they provided the FDA with all appropriate information about product risks before the
agency approved the product's labeling. See id. at 1542.
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DPT vaccine305 is more dangerous than split-cell or acellular vaccine.
Plaintiffs have alleged that vaccine manufacturers continued to produce
whole-cell DPT vaccine even though less-toxic alternatives were avail-
able.3° Vaccine manufacturers have replied that because FDA regulations
only allow them to produce whole-cell vaccine, they cannot be held liable
for injuries resulting from the use of this approved technology.
3 8
The courts are generally in agreement that neither the FDCA nor the
PHSA expressly preempts state-law claims. 3 9 Furthermore, most courts
305. DPT vaccine provides protection against diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough),
and tetanus (lockjaw). Adverse reactions to DPT are usually attributable to the pertussis
antigens in the vaccine. These reactions range from swelling, fever, and irritability to
encephalopathy, paralysis, and death. Graham ex rel. Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F.
Supp. 1483, 1485-86 (D. Kan. 1987). "The expected rate of severe reactions ranges
between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 310,000 doses." Toner ex reL Toner v. Lederle Lab., 779
F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 831 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
The organisms that cause diphtheria and tetanus excrete toxins that can be removed,
inactivated with formaldehyde, and transformed into toxoids. A toxoid can immunize
against disease by stimulating the production of antibodies in the recipient even though
the toxoid is no longer poisonous. On the other hand, the pertussis component contains
whole killed pertussis organisms. The whole-cell pertussis organism contains toxins that,
if not removed from the vaccine, can cause adverse reactions. The whole organism must
be used because the pertussis organism, Bordetella pertussis, contains fifteen or sixteen
different antigens, and scientists have not yet identified the one that stimulates the
production of antibodies. Id. at 1430; Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F. Supp.
700, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
306. The split- or fractionated-cell design was first marketed by Eli Lilly & Co. under
the trade name Tri-Solgen between 1960 and 1976. The split-cell vaccine contains pertus-
sis cells that have been chemically fragmented. Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 702. Because only
part of the pertussis organism is used to make the split-cell vaccine, it contains fewer
toxins than whole-cell vaccine. White v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ohio
1988).
Acellular vaccines, developed and used in Japan, contain antigens rather than cells
of the Bordetella pertussis organism. They are less toxic than whole-cell vaccines, but
it is not clear whether they are as effective. See Allison B. David & Ali Jalilian-Marian,
DTP: Drug Manufacturers'Liability in Vaccine-Related Injuries, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 187,
201-02 (1986).
307. See, e.g., Hurley 11, 851 F.2d at 1538; Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 706; Graham, 666
F. Supp. at 1487-88.
308. See, e.g., Hurley II, 851 F.2d at 1540; see also Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655 F.
Supp. 745, 749 (D. Utah 1987) ("[D]efendant argues that if tort actions for defective
design and testing are to be recognized at all, they must be recognized only where a
manufacturer fails to comply with some FDA rule or regulation related to design or
testing.").
309. E.g., Abbot ex reL Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); McMillan ex rel. Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674
F. Supp. 530, 532 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Wack v. Lederle Lab., 666 F. Supp. 123, 127
(N.D. Ohio 1987); Patten, 655 F. Supp. at 747; see, e.g., Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 710.
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have rejected preemption arguments based on occupation of the field,
refusing to imply preemption merely from the comprehensive FDA
regulation of pharmaceutical products.31° Instead, these courts have
reasoned that the FDA would have spoken clearly had it wished to preclude
state regulation of DPT design."'
Once again, Hurley 1 311 stands out as an exception to this approach.
Applying the four-factor test previously discussed,3 3 the district court in
Hurley I concluded that the stringent testing requirements for DPT mandated
by the PHSA and the rules promulgated under the PHSA are sufficiently
comprehensive and pervasive to occupy the field with respect to DPT de-
sign34 Consequently, the court ruled that state courts are precluded from
finding that the FDA-approved whole-cell vaccine was defectively de-
signed. 315 The federal appellate court held, however, that the comprehen-
sive nature of FDA regulation of pharmaceutical products is not, in and of
itself, enough to support a finding of preemption.31 6
With the exception of Hurley I, the courts have also rejected the notion
that damage awards based on defective design frustrate federal regulatory
objectives.317 Vaccine manufacturers have suggested several rationales to
support their actual conflict claim. According to one theory, damage awards
would affect the cost and availability of DPT vaccine, thereby frustrating
federal efforts to encourage immunization.318 Drug manufacturers have
also contended that the FDA struck a balance between safety and availability
310. E.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112; Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 710; Foyle, 674 F. Supp.
at 533; Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1490-91; MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp.
743, 745 (D.N.M. 1987); see, e.g., Martinkovic ex rel. Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab.,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Wack, 666 F. Supp. at 127-28; Morris v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1336-39 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Patten, 655 F.
Supp. at 747-49.
311. See MacGillivray, 667 F. Supp. at 745; Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112; Wack, 666 F.
Supp. at 127; Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1337 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985)).
312. Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 851 F.2d
1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
313. See supra text accompanying note 287.
314. Hurley 1, 651 F. Supp. at 1004.
315. Id. at 1003.
316. Hurley 1H, 851 F.2d at 1540.
317. See, e.g., Hurley II, 851 F.2d at 1540; Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American
Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988);
Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1988);
Graham ex rel. Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491-92 (D. Kan. 1987);
Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1338-39 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Patten
v. Lederle Lab., 655 F. Supp. 745, 749-50 (D. Utah 1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle
Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (D.N.M. 1987).
318. See Jones, 695 F. Supp. at 711; Hurley I, 651 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
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of vaccine by approving the whole-cell DPT vaccine, and that this balance
would be upset if manufacturers were subjected to large damage awards for
marketing whole-cell vaccine.31 9 However, courts have relied on the
provisions of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
(NCVIA)320 to rebut these arguments.32 This Act, which established a
compensation program for those injured by vaccines, including DPT,3"
also allowed tort actions to be brought against vaccine manufacturers. 3"
Vaccine manufacturers have also claimed that because the FDA's
decision to license whole-cell pertussis vaccine represents a considered
judgment that the vaccine's design is safe, this decision should not be
second-guessed by state-court juries.32 The courts have responded by
characterizing the FDA as a "passive agency," since the FDA can only
license product designs that manufacturers submit. For this reason, product
designs approved by the FDA may not always be the safest that are
technologically achievable. Consequently, according to these courts, FDA
approval should not preclude state courts from holding drug manufacturers
to a higher standard of product safety.3z
319. See Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1113; Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1338-39.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
321. See Hurley 1I, 851 F.2d at 1540; Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1113; McMillan ex rel.
Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674 F. Supp. 530, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Graham, 666 F. Supp.
at 1492-93; Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1339-40; Patten, 655 F. Supp. at 749; White v.
Wyeth Lab., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ohio 1988).
322. See generally Dark, supra note 276, at 844-50 (discussing compensation for
vaccine-related injuries as provided for in the Act); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty
Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a
Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 389-93 (1987) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Mahshigian, Childhood Vaccine Injury Act] (same); Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability
Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 157-58 (1988) (same); S.A. Sturges, Comment,
Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System, 30 ST. LoIs
U. L.J. 919, 938-46 (1986) (same).
323. Those who were injured more than eight years before the passage of the Act
could not recover under the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(b)(2), but were free to pursue
existing remedies under state law, see id. § 300aa-22(a), (e). Those who were injured
within eight years of the passage of the Act could either seek compensation under the
provisions of the Act or sue vaccine manufacturers under state tort-law doctrines. See id.
§§ 300aa-11(a)(4), (5), 300aa-22(a), (e). Furthermore, persons who were injured after
the enactment of the NCVIA had to complete the compensation proceeding, but reject
the award and sue the manufacturer directly. Id. § 300aa-11(a)(2). Finally, the Act
declared that no state may prevent an injured party from bringing a civil action against
a vaccine manufacturer if such an action is not barred by the Act. Id. § 300aa-22(a).
324. See Patten, 655 F. Supp. at 749; Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993,
1006 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173
(5th Cir. 1988).
325. See Hurley II, 851 F.2d at 1540; Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F.
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E. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
1. Structure and Purpose
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) 26 to the FDCA
authorize the FDA to approve the manufacture and sale of medical devices.
Two methods exist by which medical devices can receive the necessary FDA
approval. The first method is by premarket approval application (PMA).327
The PMA must contain clinical test results and other data sufficient to show
that the device is safe and effective.328 No PMA will be approved until
both FDA staff members and an outside panel of experts review the applica-
tion.329 A second procedure is available for any new device that is "sub-
stantially equivalent" to a device that was in commercial distribution before
passage of the Amendments in 1976.330 The FDA requires much less
information under this procedure than under a PMA filing.331
Section 360k(a) of the Amendments specifically limits the power of
states and localities to impose requirements for medical devices.332
Supp. 700, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). A related argument is that FDA standards are intended
to be "uniform" or exclusive. However, many courts have characterized FDA-mandated
DPT design standards as "minimum," thereby leaving state courts free to impose higher
standards on vaccine manufacturers. Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1491; MacGillivray v.
Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D.N.M. 1987).
326. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k
(1988 & Supp. 1 1991)).
327. A PMA must be submitted for any new device that is not substantially equivalent
to an "old" device, as well as for certain Class M devices. Medical devices are divided
into three categories based on potential risk: Class I devices pose the least risk, while
Class Ell pose the greatest degree of risk. Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 5, at 207-09.
328. Normally, the sponsor must conduct clinical investigations. However, under some
circumstances, the sponsor can show effectiveness through "valid scientific evidence"
other than clinical trials. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(B) (1988).
329. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 5, at 208-09.
330. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
331. This premarket notification procedure merely requires the sponsor to submit
proposed product labeling and evidence that the new device is substantially equivalent to
a pre-Amendment device. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (1992). However, the FDA may
request additional information on the "substantially equivalent" issue. Id. § 807.87(h).
332. Section 360k(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.
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Moreover, the FDA has stated that the preemptive language of section
360k(a) applies to court decisions as well as to state statutes and local
ordinances.333 For the most part, the courts have concluded that section
360k bars state damage claims against manufacturers of medical devic-
es.
334
2. Tampons
A number of recent preemption decisions have involved claims against
tampon manufacturers for failure to warn about the risk of toxic shock
syndrome.335 Tampons are classified as Class II medical devices336 and
are thus subject to FDA labeling requirements. 337 Although FDA regula-
tions require tampon manufacturers to warn consumers about the risk of
toxic shock syndrome, 331 these regulations do not prescribe specific
language; they merely require that warning statements contain certain
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
333. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1992). This regulation declares:
Section 521(a) of the act [21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)] contains special
provisions governing the regulation of devices by States and localities. That
Section prescribes a general rule that after May 28, 1976, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any requirement with
respect to a medical device intended for human use having the force and effect
of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court
decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable to such device under any provision of the act ....
Id. (emphasis added).
334. However, not all state-law claims are preempted. Cf. Desmarais v. Dow Coming
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989) (ruling that failure-to-warn claim against
manufacturer not preempted when silicone mammary implants were implanted prior to
the enactment of § 360k); Mitchell v. Iolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 878-79 (E.D. La.
1988) (holding that claim based on lack of informed consent against manufacturer of
intraocular eye lens not preempted by FDA regulations).
335. E.g., Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989); Lindquist
v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Minn. 1989); Cornelison v. Tambrands,
Inc., 710 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1989); Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F.
Supp. 288 (D.N.J. 1988); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475
(S.D. Ind. 1988); Lavetter v. International Playtex, 706 F. Supp. 722 (D. Ariz. 1988);
Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987); Edmondson v.
International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
Several courts have noted that § 360k(a) does not preempt design or manufacturing
defect claims against tampon manufacturers because the FDA has not established
regulatory standards in these areas. E.g., Moore, 867 F.2d at 246; Rinehart, 688 F.
Supp. at 478.
336. 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5460(b), 884.5470(b) (1992).
337. Id. § 801.430.
338. Id.
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information in terms that are understandable to an ordinary person. 39
Many courts have agreed with the FDA that section 360k applies to
court decisions. 4 Consequently, these courts have determined that this
provision expressly preempts inadequate-warning claims when a manufac-
turer's warning complies with FDA requirements. 4' Other courts have
applied a conflict analysis and have concluded that damage awards under
state law interfere with FDA regulatory objectives. For example, in
Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc.34 a federal district court declared that FDA
labeling requirements, which establish a uniform standard, were intended to
strike a balance between product safety and protecting interstate commerce
from the undue burdens imposed by nonuniform standards. 43 According
to the Lindquist court, damage awards would undermine this goal of
uniformity.3" In Edmondson v. International Playtex, Inc. 345 another
federal district court found that damage awards for inadequate warnings
might frustrate the FDA's policy of clear and concise warnings.
346
3. Intrauterine Devices
The FDA designates intrauterine devices (IUDs) as Class III medical
devices and regulates them under the Medical Device Amendments. 47
FDA regulations require IUD manufacturers to warn consumers that IUDs
may cause pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in some users.348 Neverthe-
less, some IUD users have brought suit against product manufacturers,
arguing that the provided warnings were inadequate. Manufacturers of IUDs
339. Id. § 801.430(d).
340. See Moore, 867 F.2d at 247; Cornelison, 710 F. Supp. at 709; Meyer, 724 F.
Supp. at 292; Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 477; Lavetter, 706 F. Supp. at 723; Stewart, 672
F. Supp. at 909; Edmondson, 678 F. Supp. at 1572. But see Lindquist, 721 F. Supp. at
1062 (noting that 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) does not unambiguously interpret the Amend-
ments as preempting common-law standards).
341. See Meyer, 724 F. Supp. at 293; Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 477; Lavetter, 706
F. Supp. at 723; Stewart, 672 F. Supp. at 909; Edmondson, 678 F. Supp. at 1572. But
see Lindquist, 721 F. Supp. at 1061 (stating that Congress did not expressly preempt
common-law claims with § 360k(a)).
342. 721 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Minn. 1989).
343. Id. at 1063.
344. Id.
345. 678 F. Supp. 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
346. Id. at 1574-75.
347. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5360 (1992).
348. Id. § 801.427 (device IUDs); id. § 310.502 (drug IUDs). Pelvic inflammatory
disease is a bacterial infection of the upper genital tract, including the uterus, fallopian
tubes, and ovaries. PID may cause adhesions to form along the walls of reproductive
organs, which can damage the reproductive organs and lead to ectopic (tubal) pregnancy
and infertility. Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1145 (D. Or. 1989).
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have maintained that section 360k of the Amendments preempts such claims,
however, the courts have uniformly rejected this argument.
349
Most of the IUD preemption cases have involved the Cu-7 IUD,
developed and marketed by G.D. Searle & Co. 5 The Cu-7 is a plastic
and copper IUD that releases small amounts of copper into the uterus. The
copper irritates the lining of the uterus, thus interfering with the implanta-
tion of the egg in the uterine wall.3"' In 1974 the FDA approved the Cu-7
as a drug, not as a medical device.
352
Because the FDA approved the Cu-7 as a prescription drug, rather than
as a medical device, many courts have concluded that the preemptive
language of the Medical Device Amendments does not apply to the Cu-7.
For example, in Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co.353 the defendant argued that
the Cu-7 should be characterized for preemption purposes as a medical
device rather than as a drug. The defendant based this argument on the fact
that the FDA has treated all IUDs alike for regulatory purposes, regardless
of whether they were approved as drugs or as medical devices.354 Howev-
er, the court cited FDA regulations to show that the FDA continued to make
a distinction among IUDs based on their status as either drugs or devic-
es.355 Consequently, the court concluded that section 360k does not
expressly preempt failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of Cu-7
IUDs.356 In Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co.357 a federal court also held that
section 360k is inapplicable to the Cu-7 IUD. The Callan court observed
349. E.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Md. 1989);
Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1152; Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1029
(D.N.J. 1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 660 (D.S.C. 1988);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988); Tetuan v.
A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1233 (Kan. 1987).
350. One exception is Tetuan, 738 P.2d 1210. In Tetuan a plastic "Dalkon Shield"
IUD caused the plaintiff's injuries. The court held that the Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 did not preempt the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim because the Dalkon Shield
was marketed between 1970 and 1974, prior to the passage of the Amendments. Id. at
1233.
351. Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1026.
352. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1145. The manufacturer voluntarily withdrew the Cu-7
IUD from the market in 1986. Id.
353. 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989).
354. Id. at 1151.
355. Id. The Allen court referred to FDA comments at 52 Fed. Reg. 23,772 (1977),
which declared: "'The agency's policy of treating some IUDs as drugs and others as
devices is unaffected by the revised definition of device found in the federal JFood, Drug
and Cosmetics Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.'" Allen,
708 F. Supp. at 1151 (quoting 52 Fed. Reg. 23,772).
356. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1151; see also Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F.
Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.N.J. 1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 657
(D.S.C. 1988).
357. 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989).
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that the Cu-7, unlike plastic IUDs, does not meet the statutory definition of
a device because the Cu-7 relies in part on chemical means to achieve its
contraceptive purpose.
3 58
A few courts have suggested that section 360k would not preempt state-
law claims even if the Medical Device Amendments applied to Cu-7 IUDs.
For example, in Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.359 the court flatly stated
that Congress intended section 360k to apply only to state statutes, regula-
tions, and local laws governing medical devices, but not to state tort
claims. 3' The Callan court agreed with this conclusion. Relying on a
House Committee report concerning the proposed statute, the court declared
that Congress understood the term "requirement," as used in section 360k,
to refer to "legislative and administrative 'programs' governing the sale and
distribution of devices, not to state common law."36 Despite the deference
courts have shown to the FDA's interpretation of section 360k in the tampon
cases, the Callan court summarily rejected the FDA's position on this
issue. 62
IUD manufacturers have also claimed that FDA regulation of pharma-
ceutical products is sufficiently pervasive to occupy the entire field of drug
labeling. Once again, however, the courts have disagreed. 3 Finally, some
defendants have suggested that damage awards in IUD cases conflict with
federal regulatory goals. 36 According to product manufacturers, damage
awards based on a theory of inadequate warning implicitly challenge the
FDA's determination that such warnings are adequateY.3 5 Most courts have
responded to this argument by characterizing FDA regulations as minimum
standards.366 According to these courts, because FDA labeling require-
358. Id. at 666; accord Tarallo, 704 F. Supp. at 657-58. The Medical Device
Amendments define "device" as an instrument "which does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man... and which
is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its principal
intended purposes." 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1988 & Supp. M1 1991).
359. 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988).
360. Id. at 1298.
361. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 667 (citing H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
45-46 (1976)).
362. Id. at 668. The court declared: "To the extent that the FDA's inclusion of the
words 'court decision' in its implementing regulations suggests otherwise, the FDA
regulation contradicts Congressional intent and is not based on a permissible construction
of the statute." Id.
363. E.g., Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1030-31 (D.N.J.
1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 659-660 (D.S.C. 1988);
Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1299.
364. See, e.g., Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 664; Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F.
Supp. 1142, 1151 (D. Or. 1989); Tarallo, 704 F. Supp. at 660; Kociemba, 680 F. Supp.
at 1299.
365. See Tarallo, 704 F. Supp. at 660; Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1299.
366. See, e.g., Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1152; Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1030;
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ments are merely minimum standards, imposition of higher standards by the
courts does not impair the FDA's regulatory authority over pharmaceutical
products.3 67
F. A Critique of Preemption Analysis in
Products Liability Cases
Most courts seem to employ similar methodologies when deciding
products liability preemption cases. The courts first examine the preemptive
language of the statute. Since none of the preemption provisions in federal
product safety statutes specifically mentions damage claims under state law,
most courts conclude that the statute in question does not expressly preempt
such claims.36
The courts then consider whether Congress intended to occupy the
field. Courts usually conclude that it did not, because most federal product
safety statutes are fairly modest in scope.369 Even when courts conclude
that Congress intended to establish uniform standards in an area, they tend
Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1299.
367. See Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 664-65. In addition, a number of courts have
suggested that Congress has tacitly agreed to accept whatever tension might arise between
state and federal regulatory objectives. E.g., id. at 665; Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at
1299. Finally, some courts, relying on Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984), have concluded that Congress would have expressed its intent clearly had it
intended to destroy existing state-law remedies. E.g., Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 665
Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1300.
368. E.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (1lth Cir. 1989) (airbags),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1095 (1990); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529
(D.C. Cir.) (paraquat), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). But see Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2619-20 (1992) (ruling that federal statute barring
"requirement[s] or prohibition[s] imposed under State law" applies to common-law
damage claims). A few courts have found airbag claims to be expressly preempted by
FMVSS 208 and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. E.g.,
Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Wickstrom
v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1236 (1988). One court has held that FIFRA expressly preempts failure-to-warn
claims. Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D. Fla. 1989). Finally,
a number of courts have concluded that the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA,
as implemented by the FDA, expressly preempt failure-to-warn claims against tampon
manufacturers. E.g., Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 293
(D.N.J. 1988); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind.
1988); Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.S.C. 1987);
Edmondson v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
369. The district court opinion in Hurley I is one exception. That court held that the
FDCA occupied the field with respect to both DPT labeling and design. See Hurley v.
Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 999-1001, 1003-1004 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 851
F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
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to decide these cases on grounds of actual conflict, rather than federal
occupation.370
By the process of elimination, most courts are forced to decide product
preemption cases on actual conflict grounds. In theory, an actual conflict
between state and federal law may arise because of impossibility, state-law
impairment of rights created by federal law, or state-law frustration of
federal regulatory objectives.37 However, as a practical matter, courts
almost always decide these cases on frustration-of-purpose grounds.
Unfortunately, the frustration-of-purpose analysis does not work very
well in the product preemption area. Courts and commentators disagree
about the preemptive effect of federal legislation concerning cigarette
labeling, airbags, pesticides, and pharmaceutical products. Hence, barring
a determinative Supreme Court decision, the courts will continue to have
difficulty deciding product preemption cases in a consistent and principled
manner.
Frustration-of-purpose analysis, as it is generally applied in product
preemption cases, is unsuccessful for a number of reasons: First, its primary
analytical concept, "statutory purpose," is inherently indeterminate; second,
it requires a court to make factual determinations without adequate informa-
tion; and third, it excludes meaningful consideration of critical policy issues.
In most instances, a court's characterization of "statutory purpose" will
be critical to the outcome of the case. However, unless the court can find
an authoritative statement of statutory purpose, either in the text of the
statute or in its legislative history, judicial conclusions about statutory
purpose are likely to be nothing more than guesswork.
Recent cigarette litigation demonstrates the futility of relying on
statutory purpose as the primary basis for deciding preemption issues. One
group of courts has determined that the primary purpose of the Cigarette
Labeling Act is to warn the public of the health hazards of smoking.37
Not surprisingly, these courts have concluded that the federal act does not
preempt common-law damage claims.373 But another group of courts
examining the same statute has found that the primary purpose of the federal
370. See, e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989),
called into doubt by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987), called into doubt by
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608; Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D.
Minn. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (V.D. Mo.
1989); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
Wattelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1039, 1040-41 (D. Mont. 1987); Roysdon
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849
F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608.
371. See supra part II.C.
372. E.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1248 (N.J. 1990);
Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
373. See, e.g., Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1255; Carlisle, 805 S.W.2d at 517.
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act is to strike a balance between health and commerce.3 74 These courts
have ruled in favor of preemption.375
A second problem with frustration-of-purpose analysis is that it requires
courts to make key findings of fact in an evidentiary vacuum. After the
court determines the statute's purpose, it must decide whether the state
action-in this case damage awards-will obstruct the achievement of this
statutory purpose. However, because reliable information is seldom
available, the court can merely speculate about the effects of possible tort
liability on product manufacturers' future conduct. Different assumptions
about manufacturers' resulting behavior can lead to different preemption
decisions. Thus, courts that believe manufacturers can simply accept
potential tort liability as a cost of doing business will often refuse to find
preemption;376 but courts that believe manufacturers will overreact in the
face of possible damage awards, thus frustrating the purpose of federal
standards, are likely to find preemption.3"
Finally, in addition to being analytically suspect, the statutory-purpose
approach often frustrates meaningful discussion of important policy
considerations. Clearly, nothing prevents a court from incorporating
contemporary values and policies into the process of statutory interpreta-
tion.378 In fact, some courts have demonstrated commendable sensitivity
to such critical issues as federalism, institutional competence, and compensa-
tion goals.379 Unfortunately, many other courts treat these issues in a
374. E.g., Pennington, 876 F.2d at 421; Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
375. See, e.g., Pennington, 876 F.2d at 421; Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Cipollone, 789
F.2d at 187.
376. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 1062 (1984); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989); Carlisle, 805 S.W.2d at 509-10.
377. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 410-12 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1065 (1990); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 806-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 407-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Schick
v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (D.S.D. 1987); Vanover v. Ford Motor
Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
378. See infra part IV.A.I.c.
379. See, e.g., Wood, 865 F.2d 395; Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239 (E.D.
Pa. 1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd,
865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1986); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
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perfunctory fashion, if they consider them at all.
As the author suggests later in this Article, policy considerations are not
merely relevant to the process of statutory interpretation, they are absolutely
critical when neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute
provides the court with authoritative evidence of the statute's meaning.3 r0
Although no method of statutory interpretation can be entirely
satisfactory in every case, the author believes that the conventional
approaches are inadequate to decide product preemption cases fairly and
consistently. For this reason, Part IV focuses on alternative approaches.
IV. A PROPOSED MODEL OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In Part III the author concludes that most courts in product preemption
cases take a one-dimensional approach to statutory interpretation that fails
to give proper consideration to many of the policy issues involved. Various
alternatives are examined below to determine whether a better approach to
resolving product preemption issues exists.
A. Theories of Statutory Interpretation
1. Conventional Approaches
Over the years, courts have employed a number of methods to interpret
statutes. The more important conventional theories of statutory interpretation
are textualism, originalism, and purposivism.
a. Textualism
Textualism puts primary emphasis on the text of the statute.38" '
Textualists believe that courts should focus on the statute's text and refrain
from examining other sources when the statutory language is clear.382 The
precept that a court should limit itself to the statutory text is sometimes
called the "plain meaning" rule. 83 Although many legal scholars have
380. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 359.
381. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv.
20, 22 (1988).
382. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 340-41.
383. William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 812 (1985); see Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern"
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975).
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criticized the textualist approach,3" it still retains considerable vitali-
ty. 38
5
b. Originalism
Originalism focuses on the original intent of the enacting legislature. An
originalist interpreter attempts to ascertain how the enacting legislature
intended to resolve a particular issue. If the enacting legislature never
expressly considered the issue, the interpreter attempts to determine how the
legislature would have resolved the issue had it been raised at the time of
the statute's enactment.386 Under a variant of this approach, known as
imaginative reconstruction, the court places itself in the shoes of the
enacting legislators and attempts to determine how they would have wanted
the statute applied to the case at bar.3 7 This process calls for an investiga-
tion of both the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous information
384. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv.
621,683-84 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism] (characterizing textualism
as anti-democratic because it rejects accepted congressional convention of using
legislative history to supplement statutory text); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 457-59 (1988) (contending
that textualism is more concerned with disciplining Congress than with making an honest
effort to carry out the intent of the legislative branch); William D. Popkin, An "Internal"
Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133,
1161-86 (1992) (criticizing the policy bases for Justice Scalia's textualist approach to
statutory interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. Rv. 405, 416-24 (1989) (arguing that adherence to text alone may
produce injustice or irrationality).
385. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2634 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part); Public Citizen v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 469-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1989); Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 127-29 (1989); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105,
113-16 (1988); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-68 (1988); McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construc-
tion and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 231, 246
("[T]he use of 'plain meaning' discourse ... is employed by every member of the
Court .... ").
386. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479, 1479-80 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation]; Sunstein, supra
note 384, at 428-29.
387. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93
(1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983); see also Richard A. Posner, The
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 848-52 (1988) (explaining
difficulties of interpreting language).
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about the general assumptions, goals, and concerns of the enacting legislature."88
c. Purposivism
Purposivism looks to the purpose of the statute rather than to the actual
intent of the enacting legislature.389 The purposivist approach assumes that
a statute can manifest a single purpose, even though those who drafted and
approved it may have had a variety of private motives and expectations. 9
Purposivism originated in the "Legal Process" movement of the 1950s.
3 91
Hart and Sacks, the leading legal process thinkers, believed that unless the
contrary unmistakably appears, a court should assume "that the legislature
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reason-
ably." 3 2 According to Hart and Sacks, proper procedures would ensure
that legislatures make decisions only after obtaining adequate data and
thoroughly discussing policy choices. 3 3 Because the enactment of every
statute is a purposive act, the interpreter merely has to identify the statutory
purpose and formulate an interpretation consistent with that purpose.394
Unfortunately, even with the aid of legislative history, an interpreter
still might be unable to ascertain a single, dominant statutory purpose.
395
Furthermore, recent scholarship suggests that many statutes are simply deals
between special interest groups and election-seeking legislators.3 96 If this
388. Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 630.
389. See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 116-21
(1988); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-80 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979); cf. California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-86 (1987); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433 (1964).
390. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 195-96 (1986-1987).
391. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 691, 693 (1987).
392. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (tent. ed. 1958).
393. Id. at 715-16.
394. Id. at 166-67.
395. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 335; Sunstein,
supra note 384, at 427.
396. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 335. Public
choice theory analyzes the legislative process using principles of economics and game
theory. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory
of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1988); Peter C. Schanck, The Only
Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and
Legislative Histories, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 815, 843-45 (1990).
One branch of public choice theory examines legislation and voting as a game in
which rational behavior by game players (legislators) yields unfortunate results for the
group as a whole. Game theory suggests that when legislators are faced with a series of
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is so, it undercuts the notion that statutes necessarily embody any sort of
mutually exclusive alternatives, the ultimate outcome is not determined by reasoned
discussion, but instead is largely determined by the order in which the alternatives are
considered for decision. This phenomenon, known as "majority cycling," suggests that
results achieved under democratic voting rules may be unprincipled in some cases. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1307 (1990).
Another branch of public choice scholarship emphasizes interactions between
interest groups and legislators. Public choice theorists regard the legislative process as
an economic transaction in which interest groups form the demand side and legislators
form the supply side. See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS
(1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); JAMES Q.
WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975). According to this model, the demand for legislation is determined by the
incidence and activity of interest groups. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265-66
(1982).
Interest groups that are formally organized and willing to spend money are likely
to be more influential with legislators than are less organized groups. Furthermore,
proposed legislation that channels costs or benefits to a narrow segment of the population
is more likely to generate interest group activity than are proposals that distribute costs
or benefits more broadly. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275,
286-87 (1988). Consequently, the demand for legislation that benefits narrowly focused
interests is likely to be much higher than the demand for legislation that benefits the
general public. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword:
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1984).
The supply of legislation depends on the legislators' responses to interest-group
demand patterns. Eskridge, supra, at 287. "Public choice theory argues that legislative
behavior is driven by one central goal-the legislator's desire to be re-elected." Id. at
288; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 891 (1987) ("[E]conomists now postulate that legislators are
motivated solely by self-interest. In particular, legislators must maximize their likelihood
of reelection."). This goal leads legislators to engage in "pork barrelling" and to avoid,
when possible, conflictual demand patterns. When legislators cannot avoid conflictual
demands, they will prefer ambiguous laws whose details must later be filled in by courts
or agencies. Eskridge, supra, at 288.
If these assumptions are correct, legislation is unlikely to be forthcoming when
there is little organized demand for it or when there is strong opposition to the demand
because of concentrated costs. Legislators are much more likely to respond to consensual
demand patterns involving benefits that are concentrated and costs that are widely
distributed. On the other hand, in conflictual demand situations when costs are concen-
trated, "legislators will often seek to delegate regulation of the group to an agency." Id.
at 288-89; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 319, 324 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Legislative Supremacy] (stating legislatures
often pass hard policy questions on to unelected bureaucrats and judges because of the
desire to be reelected).
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legitimate public purpose.3"
2. Modem Constructivist Approaches
Recently, legal scholars have proposed a variety of interpretive theories
based on modem developments in philosophy and literary criticism.398
Many of these new approaches are constructivist in nature. Constructivism
assumes that courts do not passively discover some sort of meaning embed-
ded in a statute by the enacting legislature; rather, courts must "construct"
a meaning based upon consideration of current values, beliefs, and
knowledge. 319 Unlike conventional approaches that view the courts as
legislative agents, constructivist theories regard statutory interpretation as
a partnership in which the court and the departed legislature act as
collaborators in creating statutory meaning.4"°
B. The Eskridge-Frickey "Practical Reasoning" Model
Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have developed a
constructivist model they call "practical reasoning.""' The philosophical
inspirations for this model are hermeneutics, pragmatism, and Aristotle's
theory of practical reasoning (phronesis). 4" This practical reasoning
approach can be useful when analyzing preemption issues in products
liability cases.
1. Theoretical Underpinnings
The Eskridge-Frickey model makes a number of assumptions about the
interpretive process that differ significantly from more conventional theories
397. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 334.
398. See generally, e.g., STANLEY E. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989)
(arguing that interpretation is largely based on culturally determined linguistic
conventions); Aleinikoff, supra note 381 (advocating a "nautical" approach to statutory
interpretation in which courts should interpret statutes to make them fit, as best they can,
into the current legal landscape); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 527 (1982) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes in accordance with the best
principles that will support what the legislature has done); Eskridge, Dynamic
Interpretation, supra note 386 (arguing that interpretation involves a dynamic interaction
between text and interpreter).
399. See Schanck, supra note 396, at 850-51.
400. See Eskridge, Legislative Supremacy, supra note 396, at 331; Owen M. Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177, 180 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 384, at
411-12; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J.
353, 357 (1989).
401. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 345-62.
402. Id. at 323-24.
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of statutory interpretation. First, Eskridge and Frickey believe that
interpretation is a dynamic process that involves interaction between the
interpreter and the text.4 3 Second, because the creation of statutory mean-
ing is not a mechanical operation, the interpreter must often choose among
several competing meanings. Although the range of choices may be limited
by various factors, including the statute's text and legislative history, no
particular interpretation is "objectively" determinable.' Third, when
interpreters make these choices, they are normally influenced by many
different values. 5
The Eskridge-Frickey approach also reflects pragmatistic and hermeneu-
tical insights about the nature of human reasoning. The model assumes that
decisionmaking is spiral and inductive, rather than linear and deductive."'
According to Eskridge and Frickey, human beings usually test different
solutions to a problem by evaluating each solution against a range of signifi-
cant values and beliefs.' Decisionmakers consider the evidence for each
403. Id. at 345-47. This assumption is based on hermeneutical theory. Scholars such
as Hans-Georg Gadamer reject the notion that a text has a single "true" meaning;
instead, they believe that meaning results from a dialogue or conversation between a
present interpreter and the historic text. See HANs-GEoRG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD 216-18, 273-74 (Garrett Barden & John Cumming trans., 1975).
According to Gadamer, every text has a context or horizon of assumptions the
author makes about the world around him. The interpreter also has a context or horizon.
Of course, the interpreter's horizon is different from that of the text because the world
has changed and because the interpreter is a different lerson than the author of the text.
When applying the text to a specific situation, the interpreter must find a common ground
between these two horizons. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609,617-24 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Gadamer].
Gadamer calls this a "fusion of horizons." GADAMER, supra, at 273.
When a statute is fresh and new, the horizon of the text and that of the interpreter
will be similar. Therefore, the judicial interpretation of the statute will probably yield the
same result the legislature would have reached had it considered the issue. With the
passage of time, however, the interpreter's horizon will diverge from that of the text.
Not only will the interpreter have her own policy preferences, but various other
contextual factors will have changed as well. Eskridge, Legislative Supremacy, supra
note 396, at 350.
404. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 347.
405. Id. at 348.
406. Id. The difference between linear and spiral reasoning can be illustrated by
comparing a chain to a cable. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link: the chain will
break if any one of its singly connected links does. In contrast, a cable's strength is based
not on the strength of an individual thread, but on the cumulative strength of many
threads woven together. Legal arguments are often constructed like chains, but Eskridge
and Frickey believe that the more successful legal arguments are cable-like. Id. at 351.
407. Id. at 348. The pragmatistic idea of the "web of beliefs" illustrates well this
concept. All individuals accept a variety of different values and propositions that, taken
together, constitute a web of interwoven beliefs about a particular issue. Although each
person may accord different weight to the specific values, almost no one excludes any
1993]
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value before making a decision, and then check this preliminary decision
against their most esteemed values and beliefs. This theory of decision-
making suggests that an individual's reasoning depends largely on the
context of the case at hand, specifically on the relative strength of each
consideration." 3
The practical reasoning approach also has a dynamic or interactive
aspect to it. "The various arguments . . . do not exist in isolation; they
interact with one another."' The metaphor of Gadamer's "hermeneutical
circle" captures this interaction. "A part can only be understood in the
context of the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without analyzing
its various parts."41 In other words, the individual interpretive threads
cannot be viewed in isolation; rather, each must be evaluated in relation to
the other threads.4"
2. Methodology
The Eskridge-Frickey model requires an interpreter to examine a broad
range of evidence, including the text of the statute, historical evidence, and
the evolution of the text, to form a preliminary view of the statute. The
interpreter then refines this view by evaluating possible interpretations in
terms of fidelity to the text, historical accuracy, and conformity to
contemporary policies and values. Each of these considerations is relevant,
but no one consideration necessarily outweighs the others. Thus, text whose
interpretation seems indisputable in light of some evidence may yield a
contrary interpretation if other considerations cut against it.4"
of the important values altogether. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 351.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 352. Gadamer suggests that interpreters tend to approach a text from the
perspective of their own historically situated horizon. Consequently, they usually project
their "preunderstandings" onto the text, viewed as a whole. This practice is essential to
interpretation because preunderstandings that are conditioned by tradition help the
interpreters to link their horizon with that of the text. Id. However, just as the horizon
of the text changes over time, so too does the interpreter's horizon change as a result of
encountering the text. See Eskridge, Gadamer, supra note 403, at 627. The concept of
"the hermeneutical circle suggests that a true dialogue with the text requires the
interpreter to reconsider her preunderstandings as she reviews the specific evidence in
the case, and then to formulate a new understanding" with which to approach the
interpretive task. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 352.
412. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 352. Portrayed
schematically, the practical reasoning model resembles a funnel or an inverted triangle.
More concrete inquiries, such as those concerned with the statutory text or legislative
history, lie at bottom of the diagram. More abstract inquiries, such as those concerned
with statutory evolution or current policy, are located at the top of the diagram. See id.
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a. Textual Considerations
The statutory text should be the starting point for interpretation; indeed,
courts typically regard textual arguments as the most authoritative. 413 This
emphasis on textual primacy is based on a number of considerations. First,
only the statutory text is formally enacted into law; therefore, judicial
deference to the legislature requires the interpreter to be attentive to the
text.4" 4 Furthermore, citizens typically look to the text to determine their
duties and responsibilities under a statute. 415 Finally, strict adherence to
the text imposes some discipline on activist courts.41 6
Textual analysis begins with an examination of the actual language of
the statutory provision being interpreted. The interpreter should approach
at 353. Eskridge and Frickey describe this model as "a 'funnel of abstraction.'" Id.
The model is funnel-shaped for three reasons. First, the model suggests a hierarchy
of sources. Thus, in formulating and testing preunderstanding of a statute, an interpreter
will prefer a good argument based on the statutory text rather than a conflicting but
equally strong argument based upon statutory purpose or current values. Id. Second, the
model also indicates the amount of abstraction for each source. Sources at the bottom of
the diagram involve more focused, concrete inquiries, usually with a more limited range
of arguments. As one moves up the diagram, the range of available arguments increases,
partly because the inquiry is less concrete. Id. at 353-54. Finally, the model illustrates
the pragmatistic and hermeneutical insights discussed previously. As interpreters
formulate and test their understanding of the statute, they move up and down the
diagram, evaluating and comparing the different considerations represented by each
source of argumentation. Id. at 354.
413. See id. at 354; see also Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27,
35-36, 39-40 (1987) (plain language of Fair Labor Standards Act covers holders of
collateral obtained pursuant to security agreements); Board of Governors v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-75 (1986) (statutory purposes are determined with
reference to the plain language of the statute itself); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84, 96 (1985) (plain language of Federal Land Policy and Management Act makes filing
deadlines clear); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (plain language of Endangered
Species Act admits no exceptions).
414. See Aleinikoff, supra note 381, at 23; Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533,
543 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 384, at 416. However, statutory interpretation based
on textual analysis does not necessarily involve a search for the original intent of the
enacting legislature. As Justice Holmes once remarked, "We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory
of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
415. Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TuL. L. REv. 1, 22 (1988); see William D. Popkin,
The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541, 595
(1988).
416. See Aleinikoff, supra note 381, at 23; Sunstein, supra note 384, at 416. But see
Farber & Frickey, supra note 384, at 453-61 (questioning the appropriateness of this goal
as a justification for a textualist theory of statutory interpretation).
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the statutory text as a reasonably intelligent reader, giving the text its most
sensible reading.4" 7 The interpreter should be cognizant of any special
meanings that words in the text have acquired and should also consider the
syntax and the punctuation of the sentence.4"'
Structural analysis may also serve as an interpretive tool. The
interpreter should consider how a word or phrase is used elsewhere in the
same statute or in other statutes, 419 as well as how a possible meaning
coheres with the statute as a whole.42° Interpretations that render other
provisions of the statute duplicative or superfluous should be avoided.42" '
Also, the interpreter may examine the interaction of different statutory
schemes to ascertain the statute's meaning."
b. Historical Considerations
Another factor that the interpreter should consider is the intent of the
enacting legislature.4" Original legislative expectations are important in
a democracy, where the legislature is the primary source of law. An
interpreting court that can recover the original meaning of a statute promotes
democratic values by enforcing the law as the legislature understood it, thus
limiting judicial discretion and power.
44
A statute's legislative history may often reveal legislative intent.4u
Because some sources of legislative history are more reliable than others,
the interpreter should develop a hierarchy for purposes of statutory
interpretation. Professor Eskridge has proposed the following hierarchy of
legislative history (moving from most authoritative to least authoritative): (1)
committee reports, (2) sponsor statements, (3) rejected proposals, (4) floor
417. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REv. 204, 206 (1980); Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 660.
418. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 663-64.
419. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988); NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).
420. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 660-62.
421. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 130-35 (1989) (Scalia,
J.); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449-51 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
422. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
423. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
67 (1975) (stating that courts should try to determine as accurately as possible the
legislature's intent).
424. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 356.
425. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 384, at 437; James M. Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation", 43 HARV. L. REv. 886, 888-90 (1930). Justice Scalia, among
others, has expressed deep reservations about using legislative history to interpret
statutes. See, e.g., Blanchardv. Bergernon, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Zeppos, supra note 396, at 1299-1310 (discussing textualists' views).
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and hearing colloquies, (5) views of nonlegislator drafters, and (6)
legislative inaction and subsequent legislative history.
42 6
Committee reports are typically regarded as the most authoritative
sources of legislative history. 427 A committee report represents the
collective understanding of those legislators most actively involved in
drafting the proposed legislation. 4' Moreover, committee reports may
provide evidence of bicameral agreement when the House and Senate reports
are identical or when a conference report reveals how the differences
between the House and Senate were resolved.429
Courts also rely on statements by sponsors or floor managers of
proposed legislation that becomes law.430 The views of sponsors and floor
managers are persuasive because these individuals are familiar with the
language and purpose of the proposed legislation. Furthermore, other
legislators are likely to defer to the views of the sponsors and floor
managers about the meaning of proposed statutory language.43
The rejection of proposed language by a legislative committee-on the
House or Senate floor, or by a conference committee-may also be relevant
because it indicates that the legislature expressly considered and rejected a
particular course of action.432 However, because proposed language is
sometimes rejected for nonsubstantive reasons, this source of legislative
history is usually less authoritative than committee reports or sponsor
statements.
433
In general, statements by legislators at hearings or on the floor are less
significant than remarks by sponsors or floor managers. 434 Ordinary
426. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 636-40.
427. Id. at 637.
428. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) (commenting that
committee reports are an authoritative source of legislative intent); Garcia v. United
States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (noting that committee reports are the most authoritative
source of legislative intent); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (finding that
committee report represents "considered and collective understanding" of those involved
in the drafting and studying of proposed legislation).
429. Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 637.
430. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 178-79
(1989) (quoting Sen. Javits); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 714-21
(1989) (quoting Sen. Trumbull and Rep. Wilson); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 585-88 (1988) (quoting Rep.
Griffin, Sen. Goldwater, and Sen. Kennedy); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1978)
(quoting Rep. Dingell).
43 1. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (noting that
sponsor's remarks on the floor are an authoritative guide to statute's construction).
432. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
67, 84-85 (1988).
433. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 638-39.
434. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History,
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legislators "are less likely to know... the consensus view ... on the bill,
and are more likely to behave strategically. "4' However, statements by
supporters or even opponents of proposed legislation may be considered,
especially when such statements reveal the general assumptions held about
the legislation when it was enacted. 436 In contrast, statements by nonlegis-
lative drafters and sponsors, without more, are seldom regarded as informa-
tive.437 Nevertheless, evidence from nonlegislative sources may be helpful
when the statute in question represents a compromise reached outside of the
legislature.438
Legislative silence on an issue provides little evidence of legislative
intent and is usually relied upon only to support other more authoritative
evidence of legislative intent. Such silence may have some persuasive force,
even standing alone, when there is no other evidence of legislative
intent.439 Subsequent legislative action is treated similarly: alone, it is
seldom very authoritative, but a court may cite it if no other evidence of
legislative intent is available. 4'
c. Policy Considerations
Finally, an interpreter should consider contemporary values, such as
ideas of justice and fairness, related statutory policies, and constitutional
norms." According to Eskridge and Frickey, current policies and values
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1132-33 (1983).
435. Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 639; see also W. David
Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 397-98 (1992) (discussing the practice of
"manufacturing" legislative history).
436. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 639 & n.72.
437. See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50-51 & n.13 (1986) (declining to
give significance to statements made by nonlegislators).
438. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 384, at 640.
439. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521-24 (1989)
(reasoning that failure to protect certain witnesses from impeachment on account of prior
criminal conviction was deliberate since conference committee could have easily extended
such protection to them).
440. See, e.g., Seatrain Shipbldg. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)
(stating that views of subsequent Congresses are entitled to significant weight,
particularly when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure).
441. According to Professor Eskridge, interpreting courts often give effect to current
values by incorporating them into general rules, presumptions, clear statement rules,
gap-filling rules, or background context. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Public Values]. General or meta-rules provide that even when the legislature has the
constitutional authority to order a particular result by statute, the courts will presume
against that result unless the legislature clearly directs it. Id. at 1019-20. Presumptions
declare that the legislature is presumed to accept a particular interpretation. Clear
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are part of the interpreter's horizon. If interpretation is a "fusion of hori-
zons" between the historical text and the contemporary interpreter, current
values cannot legitimately be excluded from the dialectic of interpreta-
tion.442
Contemporary policies and values originate from a variety of sources.
Some values are a part of the general heritage of western civilization; other
values can be traced to specific constitutional, statutory, or common-law
sources. Still other values have no single origin. 3 This section considers
five values or policies that are relevant to preemption and products liability:
(1) protection of interstate commerce; (2) maintenance of the federal system
of government; (3) deference to agency decisionmaking; (4) promotion of
consumer safety; and (5) provision of compensation to accident victims.
i. Interstate Commerce
Protection of trade and maintenance of national markets has long been
a national priority. As early as 1787, many delegates to the Constitutional
Convention expressed concern about the divisive effect of protectionist state
legislation.' It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of constitutional
provisions were designed to facilitate interstate and international com-
merce." 5 Of course, the most important of these provisions is the Com-
merce Clause, which declares: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To
Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."446 The Supreme Court has regularly invoked the
statement rules provide that the courts will interpret a statute in a certain way unless the
legislature clearly expresses a contrary view. Gap-filling rules provide that ambiguity will
be resolved in favor of a particular value. Id. at 1028-29. Finally, policies articulated in
other cases or statutes may provide useful background experience upon which courts can
draw for interpretive guidance. See id. at 1034.
442. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 360.
443. For example, many constitutional provisions, such as prohibitions against
vagueness, ex post facto laws, and cruel and unusual punishments, are grounded in
principles of retributive justice.
444. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425,430 (1982); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1114 (1986); Robert
L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1337-45 (1934). But see Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common
Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 15-19 (A. Dan
Tarlock ed., 1981) (arguing that very little trade existed among the states during the
eighteenth century).
445. For example, the Constitution grants Congress the power to collect duties,
imposts, and excises; and the power to coin money and establish standard weights and
measures. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
446. Id.
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Commerce Clause to protect national markets against parochial state legisla-
tion.447
State products liability doctrines impose some costs on product
manufacturers and consumers, in part because liability laws are constantly
evolving. This uncertainty makes it difficult for manufacturers and their
insurers to calculate potential liability." 8 Furthermore, since liability
standards often vary from state to state, manufacturers must alter their
products accordingly to comply with varying requirements for product
quality." 9 Finally, because liability insurance premiums are determined
on a national basis, states with liberal liability standards are able to shift
insurance costs to states with more conservative liability standards.45
For these reasons, the policy of protecting interstate commerce supports
a liberal application of the preemption doctrine. State liability doctrines
regarding warnings and product design impose costs on product sellers,
while uniform federal standards facilitate the marketing of products on a
national basis.45'
ii. Federalism
The structure and operation of American government reflect a
continuing commitment to the principle of federalism. As Professor Herbert
447. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)
(invalidating state ban on large trucks); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)
(holding invalid state packaging and labeling requirements for cantaloupes); Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (holding invalid Florida law
that regulated quantity of milk Florida processors had to buy from in-state suppliers);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating statute
limiting the length of trains passing through state); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307
(1925) (holding invalid state requirement for certificate of convenience and necessity for
interstate carriers); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878)
(holding invalid state grant of exclusive rights over communication by telegraph); Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (striking down state license requirement
for sale of out-of-state goods); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
(invalidating state restrictions on right to navigate).
448. See 0. Lee Reed & John L. Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case
for FederalAction, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389, 436-49 (1984); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty
Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort
Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REv. 685, 686 (1988).
449. Holley, supra note 4, at 818-19. Lack of uniform liability standards also increases
legal costs for product manufacturers. See Reed & Watkins, supra note 448, at 442.
450. Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of
Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 503, 508 (1987).
451. See Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. Rv. 1429, 1434 (1984) (stating that uniform federal require-
ments "ease the flow of interstate commerce"); Del Giorno, supra note 266, at 639
(stating national uniformity of regulations promotes commerce).
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Wechsler declared almost forty years ago:
In a far flung, free society, the federalist values are enduring. They call
upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist their common perils
and advance their common welfare, without undue sacrifice of their
diversifies and the creative energies to which diversity gives rise. They
call for government responsive to the will of the full national constituen-
cy, without loss of responsiveness to lesser voices, reflecting smaller
bodies of opinion, in areas that constitute their own legitimate con-
cern.
452
Federalism encourages participation in the political process, thereby
ensuring that government officials are more responsive to public needs and
desires.453 It also promotes diversity by allowing cultural differences to
find expression in different places.454 In addition, the federal system
allows states to serve as "social laboratories," experimenting with new solu-
tions to social and economic problems.455
In the two centuries following the adoption of the Constitution, the
national government's powers have steadily increased, while the powers of
the states have declined.456 Nevertheless, the states continue to exercise
substantial powers, especially in the areas of public health and safety.457
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the role of the states in the federal
system45 and has declared that the historic police powers of the states will
not be superseded by federal legislation absent the "clear and manifest"
purpose of Congress.459
452. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. Rnv. 543,
543 (1954).
453. See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 853-54 (1979).
454. Id. at 854.
455. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
456. See generally Kaden, supra note 453, at 857-83.
457. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
719 (1985) (noting that "regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern"); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424, 428 (1963) (stating that regulatory measures taken to protect public health and
welfare fall within historic police powers of the states).
458. See Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 441, at 1023; Sunstein, supra note 384,
at 469.
459. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947). For a discussion of the Court's use of the presumption during the twentieth
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Federalism appears to cut against a finding of implied preemption in
products liability cases. "[Clonsumer product safety has no roots in
historically or constitutionally defined [national] interests."" On the
contrary, the protection of consumers against injuries from defective
products falls squarely within traditional areas of state responsibility.46" '
Therefore, courts would violate the principle of federalism by abrogating a
state's power to protect its citizens' health and safety absent a clear
congressional expression to abrogate that power.462
iii. Agency Decisionmaking
Some commentators have cautioned against allowing litigants to
challenge the adequacy of federal safety standards in lawsuits against
product manufacturers.463 These commentators implicitly assume that
federal administrative agencies are more qualified than courts to establish
product safety standards.4" Administrative standards are clearer and more
century, see Bratton, supra note 65, at 626-39.
460. James L. Winokur & Jennifer Robbins, Consumer Product Safety: Preemption,
the Commerce Clause and State Regulatory Authority, 25 VILL. L. REv. 232, 261
(1980).
461. Michael R. Taylor, Federal Preemption and Food and Drug Regulation: The
Practical, Modern Meaning of an Ancient Doctrine, 38 FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 306,
311 (1983); Marilyn P. Westerfield, Comment, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What
Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 263, 270-71 (1989).
462. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485
U.S. 495, 503 (1988) ("[A] 'clear and manifest purpose' of pre-emption is always
required."); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) ("'[W]e start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'") (quoting
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C.
Cir.) ("[It is necessary to bear in mind ... the circumspect view courts must take of
a claim that Congress has preempted states from exercising their traditional police powers
on behalf of their citizens."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); see also Sunstein,
supra note 384, at 469 (claiming assumption that states have authority to regulate their
own citizens justifies "an interpretive principle requiring a clear statement before judges
will find federal preemption of state law").
463. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 268, at 193 ("In view of the comprehensiveness
and rigor of the federal scheme, courts should defer to the specific scientific and policy
judgments made by the FDA."); Theroff, supra note 191, at 662 ("A legitimate
argument exists against risking potentially outrageous damage awards through litigation
if the safety problem can be effectively addressed through regulation by an administrative
agency."); Note, supra note 264, at 788 ("[Jludicial determination [of defectiveness]...
undermines the aggregate risk calculus properly undertaken by the FDA in its capacity
as 'public health promoter [and] ... protector.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 50 Fed.
Reg. 7452 (1985))).
464. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social
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specific than standards arising from the adjudicatory process. 46 Further-
more, because of their superior resources and technical expertise, federal
agencies are in a better position than state courts to develop technologically
sound safety standards for complex products. 4' Finally, agency decision-
making procedures are better suited than the courts to deal with polycentric
issues. 467 Therefore, if federal agencies are institutionally superior to
courts in this regard, public policy supports statutory interpretations that
allow agency jurisdiction to keep pace with changing regulatory con-
cerns. 461 Public policy would also support concepts like preemption that
insulate agency decisionmaking from collateral attack in the courts.
The principle of deference to agency decisionmaking also suggests that
courts should accede to agency interpretations of law whenever a statute is
ambiguous.469 Although the concept of agency deference is not new, the
Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 65, 76 (1989).
465. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product
Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 638 (1978) [hereinafter
Henderson, Manufacturers'Liability] ("The utility of federal product safety regulations
as standards for decision is their specificity.").
466. See Landen, supra note 259, at 117 ("Only the FDA is qualified to evaluate data
and make the requisite policy judgments involved in drug regulation."); Alan Schwartz,
Proposalsfor ProductsLiability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,389
(1988) (claiming that administrative agencies often have more expertise than courts).
However, some commentators believe that safety standards promulgated by federal
agencies often reflect political compromises rather than what is technologically feasible.
See, e.g., Holley, supra note 4, at 812 (noting that federal motor vehicle safety standards
typically originate in political compromise); Theroff, supra note 191, at 619 (claiming
that administrative safety standards are often the result of compromise).
Even if agency standards are satisfactory when originally enacted, they frequently
fail to keep pace with changing knowledge and technology. See Holley, supra note 4, at
812 (stating that motor vehicle standards may become outdated by technological
advances). Furthermore, administrative agencies are sometimes "captured" by the very
industries they are supposed to regulate. See Theroff, supra note 191, at 619 (claiming
that exclusive federal regulation invites agency capture by the regulated industry). In
addition, inadequate resources and time-consuming administrative procedures can cause
federal agencies to offer weak responses to safety problems. See Teresa M. Schwartz,
The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. RV.
1121, 1151-52 (1988) (stating that agencies can address only the most serious safety
problems because of limited resources); Viscusi, supra note 464, at 88 (noting that the
regulatory process often involves substantial delays).
467. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1540-42 (1973)
(arguing that courts are not institutionally suited to adjudicate polycentric product safety
questions).
468. See Sunstein, supra note 384, at 493-96 (discussing the role of statutory
interpretation in the face of changed circumstances or statutory obsolescence).
469. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
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Supreme Court recently revivified it in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.47 In Chevron the Court declared that
when a statute is silent or ambiguous about a specific issue, a court may not
automatically impose its own construction on the statute. Instead, the court
must determine whether the agency's position is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute. If the agency's interpretation is permissible, the
court must defer to the agency, even if the court would have reached a
different interpretation.47
The response to Chevron has been mixed. A number of legal scholars
have applauded the decision because it ensures that the policy choices
involved in interpreting statutes will be made by those answerable to the
political branches of government.472 However, other commentators have
cautioned against deferring to agency interpretations unless Congress has
expressly delegated broad policymaking powers to the agency.
473
This aspect of agency deference is not likely to arise very often in
product preemption litigation. Although product manufacturers have
frequently argued for preemption, the agencies themselves have remained
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 454 (1989) (discussing the "deferential
model" of statutory interpretation model under which a court can reject an agency's
interpretation only if that interpretation is "patently inconsistent" with the statute or its
legislative history).
470. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron involved the EPA's decision to treat all air
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though encased within
a single "bubble." This bubble concept was embodied in the EPA's definition of the
statutory term "stationary source." 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983). The Court
upheld the EPA's definition against a challenge by environmental groups. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 866.
471. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
472. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) (arguing
that agencies, not courts, should resolve regulatory policy issues); Kenneth W. Starr,
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312 (1986) (noting
Chevron shifts policy-making to "democratically accountable officials" in agencies); cf.
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L. REv.
1093, 1118-22 (1987) (claiming Chevron facilitates uniform administration and
enforcement of regulatory laws).
473. E.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 372-82 (1986) (arguing for deference only when there is evidence
of congressional delegation of policymaking power); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the
Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, Address Before the American University Law
Review Banquet (April 17, 1986), in 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (contending broad
reading of Chevron could erode courts' duty to ensure that agencies obey the law); Eric
M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 993-96 (1987) (discussing congressional delegation
as the basis for judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutory law).
[Vol. 44:187
PREEMPTION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY DOCTRINES
curiously silent on the issue. So far, only the FDA has taken the position
that one of its statutes allows it administratively to preempt damage
claims.474 As long as most federal agencies refrain from taking a position
on preemption, deference to agency interpretation is unlikely to be a
significant factor in product preemption decisions.
iv. Public Health and Safety
Both federal product safety legislation and state products liability
doctrines promote public health and safety, though in different ways.
Federal statutes impose mandatory standards upon product manufacturers
and enforce these requirements with criminal sanctions; state products
liability doctrines rely on economic incentives to achieve safety goals.
Strict liability ensures that the costs of product-related injuries are borne
by manufacturers and others in the distributive chain. Manufacturers are
usually in the best position to reduce the cost of injuries because of their
control over production.475 But manufacturers would have little incentive
to spend money on product safety if the costs of product-related injuries
were borne entirely by accident victims. A strict liability rule forces
manufacturers to choose between paying damages for product-related
injuries or spending money to prevent them from occurring in the first
place.476
In most cases, the federal product safety legislation and state products
liability doctrines complement and reinforce each other.477 Accordingly,
public health and safety considerations militate against preemption when a
federal product safety statute says nothing about its effect on the validity of
state tort law.
471
v. Compensation
Both the principles of corrective justice and utilitarian-based theories of
risk distribution support compensation of those who are injured by defective
products. Corrective justice is concerned with rectifying wrongful gains and
losses. The traditional concept of corrective justice provides that wrongfully
injured victims should obtain redress and that those profiting from the
infliction of such injuries should be forced to disgorge their wrongful
gains. 479 Furthermore, modern tort theorists have suggested that corrective
474. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
475. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960); John Riper, Note, Strict Liability in
Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391, 394-95 (1980).
476. See Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products, supra note 126, at 745-46.
477. See T. Schwartz, supra note 466, at 1138.
478. See Atwell, supra note 1, at 224.
479. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
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justice supports compensatory payment to injured parties even if the
wrongdoer does not directly profit from his wrongful conduct."
The compensation principle in tort law is also based on the utilitarian
notion that losses should be shifted to the party who is best able to spread
the losses among members of a large group. Implicit in this principle is the
assumption that a loss will cause less social and economic disruption if
shared by many people.4"' Although individual victims can spread some
losses through insurance, defendants, particularly profit-making enterprises,
can usually spread losses more efficiently.4" Consequently, the loss-spread-
ing rationale strongly supports a rule requiring product manufacturers to
compensate victims of defective products. 4
However, the preemption doctrine immunizes manufacturers from
liability if their products comply with federal safety standards, regardless of
how inadequate such standards may be. In effect, preemption forces the
victim, rather than the manufacturer, to bear the personal injury loss, even
though the manufacturer could include the loss as a cost of production.
4 4
This analysis suggests that when a federal regulatory statute is ambiguous,
preemption should be disfavored to avoid denying compensation to those
injured by defective products.4s
For a brief discussion of Aristotle's theory of corrective justice and its potential
application to products liability, see Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-
Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085,
1094-98 (1990) [hereinafter Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries].
480. See Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict
Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 167-68 (1974) (claiming that imposition of tort liability
restores equilibrium upset by infliction of harm); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1972) (arguing that under
paradigm of "reciprocity," victim can recover for injuries caused by the imposition of
nonreciprocal risk). But cf Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 421, 425 (1982) (claiming that corrective justice alone does not require
wrongdoer who receives no benefit from injury to compensate injured party).
481. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 517-18 (1961); James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time
Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. RaV. 919, 933-34 (1981).
482. See Fleming James, Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923-24 (1957).
483. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of
Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966).
484. See Page Keeton, ProductsLiability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REV. 855, 856 (1963); see also Michael M. Greenfield,
Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in
Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661, 690-92 (arguing that service industries, like manufactur-
ers, should bear the risk of loss because they can distribute the cost to their customers).
485. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) ("It is difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct.").
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V. PREEMPTION AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY REVISITED
This part of the Article is devoted to reexamining the preemption cases
discussed in Part HI. The author employs an interpretive approach derived
from the Eskridge-Frickey practical reasoning model. This approach differs
in a number of respects from the approach the courts generally use in
preemption cases. First, the statutory text plays a more important role in the
interpretive process. Textual considerations are, of course, essential to
express preemption analysis, but the statutory text is also relevant to other
aspects of preemption. Additionally, this approach gives considerable weight
to legislative history. In product preemption cases, courts often discount the
value of legislative history as an interpretive tool."8 6 Finally, the approach
emphasizes policy considerations and subsequent evolution of statutes.
A. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
The text of the Federal Cigarette Labeling ,and Advertising Act is
fairly short. Only two provisions, sections 1334 and 1331, are relevant to
the preemption issue. Section 1334 is the statute's express preemption
provision. Section 1334(a) provides that no health warning "shall be
required" on any cigarette package other than the warning "required" by
this Act.4"' Presumably, Congress intended this subsection to prevent
states from requiring additional warnings on cigarette packages. Section
1334(b) is broader. It declares that "[n]o requirement or prohibition...
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes" that are labeled in conformity with this
Act.
48 9
Section 1334 uses the terms "required" and "requirement" to describe
the type of state action Congress intended to preempt. 419 Therefore, it is
necessary to determine exactly what those terms mean. According to
Webster's, the word "require" means, among other things, "to ask for
486. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987)
("Because the language of the Act is straightforward and unambiguous, we need not
resort to legislative history to determine congressional intent."), called into doubt by
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e find the language of the statute itself a
sufficiently clear expression of congressional intent without resort to the Act's legislative
history."); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
("I disagree with the emphasis these courts place on the legislative history . . .
487. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
488. Id. § 1334(a) (emphasis added).
489. Id. § 1334(b) (emphasis added).
490. Section 1334(b) also refers to "prohibitions," id., but that term is not directly
relevant to claims based on failure to provide adequate warnings.
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authoritatively or imperatively; claim by right and authority; insist upon,
usually with certainty or urgency" or "to impose a compulsion or command
upon (as a person) to do something. "491 "Requirement," which is derived
from "require," means "something that is wanted or needed" or "something
that is called for or demanded."" 9 These definitions convey the idea of a
peremptory command issued by some authoritative source. As Justice
Blackmun noted in Cipollone, legislative and administrative standards are
consistent with this idea, but common-law rules are not.49 Legislative and
administrative commands give the regulated party no choice but to comply.
Tort liability, on the other hand, encourages compliance by subjecting the
defendant to economic pressure, but does not compel or mandate compli-
ance. 49 For this reason, contrary to the plurality in Cipollone, textual
considerations alone do not clearly show that Congress intended to preempt
existing common-law rules by including the term "requirements" in section
1334.
Furthermore, none of the discussions and debates about preemption that
appear in congressional reports or hearings suggests that section 1334 was
intended to preempt common-law tort claims. 49 Most references in the
legislative history to tort liability deal with the assumption-of-risk de-
fense.496 The legislative hearings reveal that most parties assumed that
assumption of risk, based on the statutory warnings, would not bar tort
actions against cigarette manufacturers. 49 Most members of Congress
491. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1929 (3d ed. 1986).
492. Id.
493. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2627 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
494. Id. at 2627-28; see also Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 125,
at 926-27.
495. See Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 514 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
496. See, e.g., Cigarette Labeling and Advertising-1965: Hearings on H.R. 2248,
3014, 4007, 7051, and 4244 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2248] (state-
ment of TheodoreEllenbogen, Acting Assistant, General Counsel for Legislation, HEW);
Cigarette Labeling andAdvertising-1969: Hearings on H.R. 643, 1237, 3055, and 6543
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
577-78 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 643] (colloquy between Rep. Moss and
Joseph F. Cullman, III, chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Philip Morris,
Inc., and chairman of the executive committee, The Tobacco Institute), 579 (statement
of Rep. Watson), 579-81 (colloquy between Rep. Dingell and Joseph F. Cullman, I),
589 (colloquy between Rep. Thompson and Joseph F. Cullman, RI), 591-92 (colloquy
between Rep. Satterfield and Joseph F. Cullman, III).
497. See 111 CONG. REc. 16,543-44 (1965).
The legislative record makes it clear that passage of this law and
compliance by the manufacturer in no way affects the right to raise the
defense of "assumption or [sic] risk" and the legal requirement for such a
defense to prevail; nor does it shift the burden of proof, nor could it be
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apparently assumed that the Act would not bar tort claims against tobacco
companies. This view was shared by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.49 Moreover, when Congress amended the Cigarette Labeling
Act in 1969, members of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce reaffirmed that the Act should have no effect on personal injury
claims.499
Since neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress intended to preempt state tort-law damage claims,
contemporary values and policies may aid in the interpretation of the statute.
The protection of commerce is a policy that is clearly relevant to preemp-
tion. Section 1331 declares that the Act's labeling requirement is intended
to protect "commerce and the national economy."" However, the Act's
legislative history reveals that Congress was largely concerned about the
economic effects of diverse state labeling requirements. For example, a 1965
House Report mentioned that many of the witnesses who testified at
committee hearings on the bill warned that "a multiplicity of State and local
regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages could create chaotic
marketing conditions and consumer confusion." am Similar concerns were
raised in 1969 when the Cigarette Labeling Act was revised."m On the
other hand, nothing in the Act's legislative history suggests that Congress
was concerned about the economic effects of tort liability upon the tobacco
industry or the national economy.
Subsequent events also indicate that state statutes and administrative
regulations, not tort law, are the proper focus of the Act's preemption
section. The experience of the past thirty years has shown that product
manufacturers can adjust to varying state standards of tort liability because
tort law, unlike government regulations, allows for flexible responses. 03
considered a legal or factual bar to the plaintiff user.
Id. (statement of Rep. Fascell).
498. Hearings on H.R. 2248, supra note 496, at 176 (HEW considers such suits to be
"a private matter . . . not . . . regulated by this bill") (statement of Theodore
Ellenbogen).
499. See Hearings on H.R. 643, supra note 496, at 579 ("[N]owhere in the act of
1965 does it preclude an individual or prevent an individual from pursuing a common-
law liability [action] against any tobacco company.. .. ") (statement of Rep. Watson).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
501. H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350,2352; see also Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings on S.
559 and S. 547 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 254
(1965) (statement of Sen. Magnuson), 548 (statement of Bowman Gray, chairman of the
board, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.); S. REP. No. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
502. See Hearings on H.R. 643, supra note 496, at 16 (statement of Rep. Perkins),
30 (statement of Rep. Fountain), 554 (statement of Joseph P. Cullman, III); S. REP. No.
566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663.
503. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 125, at 933.
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In addition, when Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act of 1986,"0 which closely resembles the Cigarette
Labeling Act, it included a savings clause that expressly preserved common-
law claims based on failure to warn. 5. The Senate Committee Report
stated that manufacturers and sellers could add additional warnings to those
required by the Smokeless Tobacco Act." 6 This evidence suggests that
Congress believes state tort liability does not necessarily conflict with
federal labeling requirements or impose an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
5 7
Federalism values are also relevant to preemption. As a number of
courts have acknowledged, health and safety are traditional state con-
cerns. 08 States have a strong interest in compensating their citizens who
are injured by defective products."° The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the need to respect legitimate state interests by creating a presumption
against preemption to prevent federal legislation from inadvertently
overriding state law."' This presumption has persuaded a number of
504. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1988)).
505. 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1988). This provision states: "Nothing in this chapter shall
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other
person." Id.
506. S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7, 13.
507. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986),
rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), called into doubt by Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 514-15
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991); see also Taylor A. Ewell, Comment, Preemption of Recovery in
Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued for Failure to Warn Even Though They
Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements?, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 910
(1987).
508. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989)
("This state has a vital interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.");
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
("That health and safety matters lie within the domain of the states has been long
recognized by the Supreme Court."), 4'd in part and rev'd in part, 437 N.W.2d 655;
Carlisle, 805 S.W.2d at 507 ("[Ihe Act regulates in an area of traditional state
control.").
509. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e
observe that the Cipollones' tort action concerns rights and remedies traditionally defined
solely by state law."); Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1176 ("[R]emedying personal
injuries ... traditionally has been an area of state concern."); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1249-50 (N.J. 1990) ("'[T]here is a strong state interest
in compensating those who are injured by a manufacturer's defective products.'")
(alteration in original) (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 391 (N.J.
1984)).
510. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
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courts to reject preemption arguments.1
Ironically, in Cipollone Justice Stevens declared that federalism
principles dictate that the Court should narrowly construe preemption
provisions and not preempt state law unless required to do so by the "clear
meaning" of the statutory text.5 12 Nevertheless, he concluded that the
federal cigarette labeling statute preempted common-law failure-to-warn
claims. 513 Similarly, Justice Blackmun stated that the Court should
narrowly construe preemption provisions to avoid improper encroachment
upon state power.514 His interpretation of the Act's preemption provision
appears to be more consistent with the application of the Court's "clear
meaning" rule.
Public health and safety policies are also relevant to interpreting the
Act. The text of section 1331 declares as a purpose of the Act that "the
public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking. "515 The legislative history also indicates that the Act
represented a congressional response to public concerns about the health
effects of smoking. For example, in its report to Congress, the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce declared: "The principal
purpose of the bill is to provide adequate warning to the public of the
potential hazards of cigarette smoking. "516
Commentators have noted that tort liability also promotes product safety
by encouraging cigarette manufacturers to make their products safer, 517 to
engage in additional product safety research,1 and to provide timely and
511. E.g., Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247 ("'[We are not to conclude that Congress
legislated the ouster of [traditional common-law remedies] in the absence of an
unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect.'") (second alteration in original)
(quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963));
Carlisle, 805 S.W.2d at 508 ("It is in such close and difficult cases that a presumption
against preemption seems to us most appropriate. . . ."); Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 695
("The preservation of that [federal] system requires a presumption 'that Congress did not
intend to displace state law.'") (quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 746).
512. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18 (1992).
513. Id. at 2621-22.
514. Id. at 2625-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
515. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
516. H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 2350.
517. See Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMoRY L.J. 269,
275-76 (1977) (suggesting that more efficient filters would reduce smoking-related
injuries); Levin, supra note 126, at 216-17 (suggesting that cigarette manufacturers could
reduce health risks by removing additives, pesticides, and other dangerous substances
from tobacco).
518. Cf. Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette
Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 809, 826 (1986) (arguing that imposing liability on
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effective warnings about smoking-related risks.5"9 A finding of preemption
immunizes cigarette manufacturers from tort liability, thereby weakening the
economic incentive to make their products safer. This result contradicts the
Act's health and safety objectives.'
Compensation is the final policy that an interpreter should consider.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a product manufacturer has a responsibil-
ity to compensate those who are injured by its defective products. 52' The
arguments for imposing liability on product manufacturers seem especially
applicable to cigarette manufacturers. 5" Because preemption leaves injured
parties without a remedy, compensation values support an interpretive rule
that discourages a finding of preemption, at least when Congress has failed
to speak clearly.5"
cigarette manufacturers would lead to an optimization of accident costs and safety costs).
But see Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries, supra note 479, at 1106
(discussing several factors that discourage research when health effects are long-term).
519. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 125, at 946; Garner, Cigarette
Dependency, supra note 126, at 1461-62.
520. See Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 511 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
("Moreover, holding common-law claims preempted would remove the motivation for
cigarette manufacturers to voluntarily include additional health information and/or
warnings in or on cigarette packages and advertisements. That sort of disincentive would
actually hinder the Act's primary purpose of achieving wide dissemination of such
information.").
Some courts have denied that the Act is really concerned with the protection of
public health and safety. According to these courts, Congress intended to establish a
"balance" or compromise between public health and commerce. The terms of this
compromise are set forth in the warning language mandated by § 1333; therefore, any
state action that encourages manufacturers to depart from this statutory language would
disturb this "balance" and would be contrary to the purpose of the Act. See Pennington
v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989), called into doubt by Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988), called into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608;
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626, (1st Cir. 1987), called into doubt by
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d
Cir. 1986); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989).
The present status of this theory is unclear because the Supreme Court did not rely on
it in Cipollone.
521. See supra part IV.B.2.c.
522. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability, supra note 125, at 942-44.
523. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,250-51 (1984); Forster, 423
N.W.2d 700-01 ("Therefore, remedies provided by state tort law will not be withdrawn
from Minnesota citizens without either an express statement from Congress or a clear and
unequivocal finding of implied preemption."); Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1251 ("We are
convinced that had Congress intended to immunize cigarette manufacturers from
packaging, labeling, misrepresentation, and warning claims, it knew how to do so with
unmistakable specificity."); Carlisle, 805 S.W.2d at 512 ("To infer that Congress set out
to eliminate such remedies without even commenting on their elimination would be even
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Justice Blackmun raised this issue in Cipollone. He acknowledged that
the compensatory function of tort law is distinct from the regulatory
purposes of the cigarette labeling statute.524 He also expressed doubt that
Congress would destroy existing state remedies for injured parties without
replacing such remedies with a substitute remedial scheme. 5z
To summarize, neither the Act's text nor its legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress intended to preempt state-law damage claims.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that preemption is necessary
to implement the provisions of the Act. Finally, an interpretation of the text
that preserves existing tort remedies is more consistent with contemporary
values and policies than is an interpretation that destroys state tort remedies.
B. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
1. Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in General
Several provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(NTMVSA)526 are relevant to the preemption issue. Section 1392(d)
declares that "no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect .... any safety standard
. . . which is not identical to the Federal standard."527 However, section
1397(k) of the statute states: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law."51
These provisions lend themselves to a variety of interpretations. For
example, one could argue that the "safety standards" that section 1392(d)
purports to preempt only safety standards that have been formally promul-
gated by a legislature or an administrative agency. This interpretation would
exclude tort doctrines from preemption under section 1392(d). 2 9 Thus,
section 1397(k) could be construed to preserve all tort claims against
automobile manufacturers. This interpretation is plausible if tort doctrines
are considered to be inherently different from legislative and administrative
standards.530
more perilous.").
524. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2628 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
525. Id. at 2630.
526. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
527. Id. § 1392(d).
528. Id. § 1397(k).
529. See, e.g., Welsh ex rel. Welsh v. Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 318-
21 (D. Md. 1990) ("Common law tort standards of care do not constitute 'safety stan-
dard[s]' within the meaning of § 1392(d) and thus are not preempted by that section.")
(alteration in original).
530. See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (D. Mass. 1987)
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Of course, one could also argue that tort liability doctrines are "safety
standards" for purposes of section 1392(d).531 Nothing in section 1392(d)
excludes tort doctrines from the definition of "safety standards."532
However, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the exclusion of
tort liability in section 1397(k). Nevertheless, sections 1392(d) and 1397(k)
can be reconciled by interpreting section 1397(k) as preserving common-law
tort liability doctrines from preemption even if these state-law doctrines are
considered "safety standards.""'
Another interpretation is that section 1397(k) merely preserves
common-law liability for product defects not covered by federal safety
standards.534 However, if this interpretation is correct, section 1397(k)
would apparently be unnecessary because section 1392(d) does not preempt
state standards for aspects of performance not regulated by a federal
standard.535 Thus, common-law actions based on product conditions not
covered by the Act would not need the protection of the savings clause. 36
(discussing differences between administrative standards and common-law liability), rev'd
on other grounds, 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990);
Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
("[C]ommon law claims and regulation by state agencies or legislatures are not
identical.").
531. See, e.g., Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Md. 1986)
(stating that a judicial decision sustaining a jury verdict is state action that establishes a
"safety standard"); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Mo.
1986) (stating that state tort law damages are "a form of state regulation subject to the
Supremacy Clause"); see also Miller, supra note 186, at 912 (discussing the argument
that § 1392(d) preempts common-law actions).
532. Wood, 865 F.2d at 401 ("Section 1392(d) says nothing about being limited to
legislatively established state standards."); Cox, 646 F. Supp. at 763 (D. Md. 1986)
("IT]here is nothing in the language of the Safety Act or in its legislative history to
suggest that the term 'safety standard' is intended to encompass only standards adopted
by a regulatory body.").
533. Wood, 865 F.2d at 401-02; cf. Gingol4, 567 A.2d at 322-23 (reasoning that even
if common-law liability is the equivalent of state regulation, "the issue would then
be . . . 'whether it is the type of regulation Congress intended section 1392(d) to
preempt'") (quoting Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D.N.Y.
1987)).
534. E.g., Cox, 646 F. Supp. at 764 ("[C]ompliance with the federal standards does
not protect an automobile manufacturer from liability for design or manufacturing defects
in connection with matters not covered by the federal standards."); Wickstrom v.
Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("[C]ompliance
with federal standards will not protect automobile manufacturers from liability for design
defects in connection with matters not covered by federal standards."), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1236 (1988); see also Miller, supra note 186, at 915-16; Wilton, supra note 186,
at 20-21.
535. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 412 ("If the federal government has not issued a safety
standard on a certain aspect of performance, the states are allowed to set their own stand-
ards in these areas.").
536. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (1 1th Cir. 1989) ("Such
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Some courts have maintained that Congress did not anticipate the
development of design defect litigation based on strict liability in tort.
According to these courts, Congress would not have wanted section 1397(k)
to protect strict liability design defect claims from preemption under section
1392(d). 37 However, this interpretation of section 1397(k) is questionable
because, as a matter of historical fact, many states had accepted modem
theories of products liability when the Act was passed.
5 31
Textual analysis of sections 1392(d) and 1397(k) suggests a number of
possible interpretations, but does not provide any clear answer to the
preemption question. Consequently, one should look to the statute's
legislative history for interpretive guidance. Unfortunately, nothing in the
legislative history indicates that Congress considered the Act's effect on state
tort liability doctrines. A Senate Report on the Motor Vehicle Safety Bill
devoted only two paragraphs to a discussion of the relationship between state
and federal law. The Report clearly indicates that Congress intended the
states to have some role in the regulation of motor vehicles.5 39 The Report
a construction, however, would render the savings clause a mere redundancy since the
preemption clause itself provides that where a federal standard does not govern 'the same
aspect of performance' as the state standard, the state standard is not [expressly]
preempted."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Welsh ex rel. Welsh v. Century
Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Md. 1990) ("[R]eading § 1397(k) as only being
applicable to those situations where no safety standard has been promulgated.., would
render § 1397(k) a mere redundancy."); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp.
532, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (refusing to limit § 1397(k) to matters not covered by federal
law or to cases of negligent compliance); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d
927, 935 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]f the
savings clause is said to touch only matters not covered by the federal safety standards,
then its passage was unnecessary in the first instance."); Gingokl, 567 A.2d at 323
("[B]y construing section 1397[(k)] so narrowly as to make its existence superfluous....
we would in effect be rendering the section's plain language and purpose nugatory.").
537. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 404-06; Schwartz, 554 So. 2d at 931 (Steagall, J.,
concurring) ("The clear meaning of the saving clause is that compliance with any safety
standard issued under the Safety Act will not exempt any person from any liability under
the common law as it existed at the time of the Safety Act's passage.").
538. See Taylor, 875 F.2d at 825 (quoting with approval Wood, 865 F.2d at 421
(Selya, J., dissenting) ("[A]n unbiased glimpse of tort law circa 1966 indicates to me that
design defect litigation, although then a relatively recent phenomenon, was not so new
as to catch the Congress unawares.")); Schwartz, 554 So. 2d at 941 (Hornsby, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[M]y review of the law convinces me that
negligent design cases were, in fact, part of the common law by 1966.").
539. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2720. The Report declared that states could adopt standards
identical to the federal standards and enforce them over the life of a vehicle. Id.
Furthermore, states were authorized to set safety standards in areas not regulated by the
federal government, Wood, 865 F.2d at 412, and to impose higher standards governing
vehicles they purchased for their own use, S. REP. No. 1301, supra at 12, reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2720.
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also declared that "the Federal minimum safety standards need not be
interpreted as restricting State common law standards of care. Compliance
with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any person from
product liability at common law."'4 This language suggests that Congress
did not intend section 1392(d) to preempt state tort law.5
41
A House Report discussing section 1397(k) also briefly addressed the
preemption issue. The Report stated: "It is intended, and this subsection
specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a
defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law
particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability."542 This
language reinforces the plain meaning of section 1397(k) that the Act does
not preempt state tort actions.543
Statements on the House floor also indicate that Congress did not intend
to displace common-law remedies. For example, Representative Dingell, the
Bill's sponsor, declared:
[We have preserved every single common-law remedy that exists
against a manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle purchaser. This
means that all of the warranties and all the other devices of common law
which are afforded to the purchaser, remain in the buyer, and they can
be exercised against the manufacturer. 544
Additional support for this interpretation can be found in remarks Senator
Magnuson made when the Bill went to a conference committee. At that
point, the Senate version of the Bill did not have a savings clause. The
conference committee voted to adopt the savings clause that appeared in the
House version of the Bill. Referring to the savings clause, which subse-
quently became section 1397(k), Senator Magnuson remarked: "This
provision makes explicit, in the bill, a principle developed in the Senate
Report. "145 The Senator went on to declare that "[t]his provision does not
prevent any person from introducing in a lawsuit evidence of compliance or
540. S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 539, at 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2720.
541. Welsh ex rel. Welsh v. Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Md.
1990); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Richartv. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1466-67 (D.N.M. 1988), rev'dsub nom.
Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1065 (1990); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922, 925-27 (E.D.N.Y.
1987); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 323-24 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989).
542. H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).
543. See Welsh, 745 F. Supp. at 317; Kolbeck, 702 F. Supp. at 540; Richart, 681 F.
Supp. at 1467; Murphy, 650 F. Supp. at 926; Gingold, 567 A.2d at 330.
544. 112 CONG. REc. 19,663 (1966) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
545. Id. at 21,487 (statement of Sen. Magnuson).
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noncompliance with Federal standards."546 These statements are inconsist-
ent with the view that Congress intended to preempt state tort law.547
According to some courts, however, the Act's legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to make federal motor vehicle safety
standards uniform throughout the country, thereby preempting nonidentical
common-law requirements. 4 For example, the Senate Report declared:
"The centralized, mass production, high volume character of the motor
vehicle manufacturing industry in the United States requires that motor
vehicle safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced, but that
they be uniform throughout the country."549 Some language in the House
Report also supports a uniformity theory. In its analysis of the Bill's
preemption provision, the House Report stated: "Basically, this preemption
subsection is intended to result in uniformity of standards so that the public
as well as industry will be guided by one set of criteria rather than by a
multiplicity of diverse standards."'
However, nothing in the Act itself suggests that uniformity was a goal
at all, much less one that would override an express statutory provision
preserving common-law actions."' Moreover, the uniformity theory is
undercut by provisions in the Act and in the legislative history that create
exceptions to the uniformity requirement.52 Thus, an argument for
546. Id.
547. See Miller, supra note 186, at 920-21.
548. See, e.g., Wattelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (D. Mont.
1987) ("Apparently, Congress intended that there should be but one set of national stand-
ards to assure the safety of motor vehicles."); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp.
761, 764 (D. Md. 1986) ("[T]he legislative history of the Act makes clear that a
significant subsidiary purpose . . . was to create uniform motor vehicle safety
standards."); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 1986)
("Congress, thus, intended that there should be but one set of national standards to assure
the safety of motor vehicles."); see also Michael Hoenig, Resolution of "Crashworthi-
ness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 633, 713-15 (1981) (claiming that both the
statute and the legislative history clearly indicate that Congress intended to achieve
uniform national safety standards); Timothy Wilton & Richard P. Campbell, Effect of
Federal Safety Regulations on CrashworthinessLitigation, 22 ToRT & INS. L.J. 554, 561
(1987) (stating that a significant congressional purpose was to establish uniform require-
ments for the auto industry).
549. S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 539, at 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2720.
550. H.R. REP. No. 1776, supra note 542, at 17.
551. See Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
("[S]ection 1381 expressly declares the Safety Act's purpose. That section does not
expressly include national uniformity among the Act's purposes."); Gingold v.
Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("Uniformity
of safety standards is a goal articulated in the legislative history but not one articulated
in the Act itself .... ").
552. For example, states are allowed to impose higher standards on manufacturers for
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uniformity based solely on legislative history is fairly weak. 5
Since neither the text nor the legislative history reveals a clear
congressional position on the preemption issue, it is necessary to consider
contemporary values and policies. One policy, that of encouraging trade and
economic activity, appears to support an interpretation of the Act that
preempts nonuniform common-law liability rules. Liability rules that vary
from state to state impose substantial economic costs on automobile
manufacturers.554 Uniform standards provide regulatory certainty and
allow manufacturers to use their economic resources more productively. 5
Hence, interpreting the Act to achieve national uniformity in motor vehicle
safety regulation would promote trade and economic activity.5"6
Deference to agency decisionmaking also seems to support preemption
of state tort law. Administrative agencies have superior expertise and greater
access to information than do courts.557 In addition, regulatory agencies
are better equipped to consider economic, environmental, and energy issues
in formulating safety standards. 5 ' However, the force of this institutional
competence argument is weakened by evidence that the administering
agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), has
motor vehicles purchased for the states' own use. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
553. See Welsh ex rel. Welsh v. Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 319 (D. Md.
1990) ("The legislative history also reveals no intent to promote uniformity per se."); see
also Theroff, supra note 191, at 613 ("These bald statements undercut court findings that
Congress intended primarily ... to establish a uniform regulatory regime . . ").
554. See Peter J. Mooney, Note, Judicial Participation in the Establishment of Vehicle
Safety Standards: A System in Need of Reform, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 902, 911 (1981)
("Additional support for exclusive legislative regulation is the potentially devastating
economic consequences to the automobile industry from exposure to virtually unlimited
liability at the hands of juries, who are restricted in their discretion only by vague
notions of reasonableness and fitness."); see also Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648
F.2d 833, 855 (3d Cir.) (noting that varying state tort laws create "inefficiencies and
inequities"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d
950, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing how state tort law affects "national social and
economic goals"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
555. See Holley, supra note 4, at 818-19.
556. See Wilton, supra note 186, at 30 ("[U]niformity of the [safety] standards is
crucial for the motor vehicle manufacturing industry as well as for the safety of the
public.").
557. A. Schwartz, supra note 466, at 389 (stating that administrative agencies usually
have more expertise and greater economies of scale than do courts); see also Comment,
Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 299, 305 (1969) ("Independent research can give a regulatory body a better
understanding of design complexities than judges and juries are able to achieve through
expert testimony."). See generally supra part IV.B.l.c.iii.
558. See Werber, supra note 182, at 47 (noting that federal motor vehicle safety
standards "balance energy and air pollution requirements, cost factors and feasibility, and
the effects upon other vehicles in accident circumstances").
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not aggressively pursued the consumer safety goals of the Act." 9 In
addition, the automotive industry historically has exercised considerable
influence over the NHTSA.SW Accordingly, the principle of agency defer-
ence does not provide overwhelming support for preemption in motor
vehicle safety standards cases.
Federalism values undermine a finding of preemption. Consumer safety
regulation has traditionally been left to the states. 6 Hence, the presump-
tion against preemption cautions against ousting the states from this
acknowledged area of state responsibility. 62
Retaining state tort law is also consistent with the policy of promoting
health and safety. Consumer safety is clearly a principal goal of the
Act.563 The Act's declaration of policy states "that the purpose of this
chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents. "I' The legislative history confirms that
Congress considered automotive safety to be the Act's primary purpose.
56
559. See T. Schwartz, supra note 466, at 1158-59. According to some critics, the
NHTSA has focused "nearly exclusively on modifying driver behavior" and "has largely
ignored the critical technological mandate" of the Act to establish product safety
standards. See NHTSA Authorization and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 2248 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1985) (statement of Rep.
Wirth).
560. See Miller, supra note 186, at 909 (contending that the history of airbag
regulation demonstrates industry influence over NHTSA).
561. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Welsh ex rel. Welsh v. Century Prods., Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 313, 316-17 (D. Md. 1990); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927,
937 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
562. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Taylor,
875 F.2d at 823; Schwartz, 554 So. 2d at 937 (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Furthermore, courts should be reluctant to find preemption because
Congress can easily correct a wrong decision, but states are powerless to do so. See id.
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985)); Gingold v.
Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 318-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
563. Welsh, 745 F. Supp. at 318 ("The Safety Act was enacted in 1966 to achieve one
overriding objective: to counteract the 'soaring rate of death and debilitation on the
Nation's highways.'") (quoting S. REP. NO. 1301, supra note 539, at 1, reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2709); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922, 926
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Clongress' primary goal was to improve and promote automotive
safety."); Schwartz, 554 So. 2d at 933 (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[t]n passing the Act, the primary objective of Congress was to promote
safety".); Gingold, 567 A.2d at 328 ("[Tihe primary goal of the Act is to reduce traffic
accidents and injuries on the highways.").
564. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988).
565. S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 539, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N at 2714
("The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance
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Tort liability also promotes consumer safety;566 thus, the Act and state tort
law share the same objective. Furthermore, no serious conflict exists
between the two systems. In fact, they complement each other in a way that
enhances overall product safety. 67 Therefore, safety policies support a
finding of no preemption. 68
Finally, the compensation goal also supports an interpretation of the Act
that preserves state tort liability doctrines. Existing tort doctrines provide
compensation to those injured by defective products. These parties would be
left without a remedy if the Act was construed to preempt state tort law.
Furthermore, since compensation of tort victims is traditionally a state
responsibility, courts should not destroy existing remedies in the absence of
a clear congressional mandate.569
In summary, neither the text of the statute nor its legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to impose a general ban on common-law
tort actions for motor vehicle safety. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
federal motor vehicle regulations and state tort liability cannot coexist.
of standards under this bill."); H.R. REP. No. 1776, supra note 542, at 16 ("Motor
vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of this bill and each standard must be related
thereto.").
566. See Reed & Watkins, supra note 448, at 445.
567. See T. Schwartz, supra note 466, at 1161.
568. The primacy of safety in the Act also undercuts the argument in favor of
preemption based on uniform safety standards. Even if uniformity is desirable for
economic reasons, it is subordinate to the achievement of safety. Welsh ex rel. Welsh v.
Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313,319 (D. Md. 1990) ("[U]niformity in regulation
is a goal of the Safety Act only insofar as it promotes safety."); Richart v. Ford Motor
Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 (D.N.M. 1988) ("While promoting uniformity was an
objective of Congress, its primary goal was to improve and promote automotive
safety."), rev'd sub nom. Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927,
933 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As a
subordinate purpose, Congress sought to achieve uniformity in the standards by which
automobile manufacturers are governed.").
569. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[A]
strong presumption exists against finding express preemption when the subject matter,
such as the provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries, is one that has
traditionally been regarded as properly within the scope of states' rights".), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Welsh, 745 F. Supp. at 316-17; Richart, 681 F. Supp. at 1466
("It is difficult to believe that Congress would remove all means of judicial recourse for
injuries negligently caused by a manufacturer without comment or express language.");
Garcia v. Rivera, 541 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("There is a presumption
against preemption in the areas of traditional state power, such as compensation for
torts."), rev'd, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 980
(N.Y. 1991); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 318 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) ("The presumption against preemption is explained on grounds which
recognize, .. . the States' long-established interest in providing compensation for victims
of torts.").
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Finally, many contemporary values and policies favor the retention of state
tort remedies for injured consumers. Therefore, federal motor vehicle safety
standards should not preempt common-law tort claims in most circumstanc-
es.
2. FMVSS 208
Statutes often undergo a lengthy process of implementation by courts
or agencies. Therefore, courts must consider evolutional factors when
interpreting such statutes or their regulatory progeny.570 Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 20871" is a paradigm of a regulation
with a lengthy and convoluted history.572 Both Congress and the NHTSA
have played significant roles in the development of FMVSS 208.51
The most important instance of congressional involvement in the airbag
controversy occurred in 1974, when Congress amended the Act to remove
the NHTSA's ability to require the installation of airbags in passenger
cars.574 The 1974 amendments declared that no federal safety standard
could require a manufacturer to provide airbags.575 The amendments also
specifically approved the existing FMVSS 208, which did not mandate the
installation of air bags. 76 Furthermore, Congress specified certain proce-
dures that the NHTSA would have to follow before recommending
mandatory use of airbags.577 Finally, the amendments provided for a
bicameral legislative veto of any motor vehicle standard requiring
airbags.
578
The current version of FMVSS 208579 allows manufacturers to choose
among three options, depending on when the automobile was manufactured:
(1) a passive restraint system, such as airbags, used in conjunction with
seatbelts;580 (2) a combination of passive restraints, detachable shoulder
570. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 359.
571. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1991). FMVSS 208 specifies equipment requirements for
occupant restraint systems, including airbags. Id.
572. This safety standard has undergone numerous changes since its initial enactment
in 1967. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
573. Theroff, supra note 191, at 584 n.37.
574. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492,
see. 109, § 125(a), (b), 88 Stat. 1470, 1482 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(a)-(b)
(1988)).
575. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(a)-(b)(2).
576. Id. § 1410b(b)(3)(A).
577. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1452, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6084, 6108.
578. See 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(d).
579. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1991).
580. Id. § 571.208, S4.1.2.1.
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harnesses, lap belts, and warning systems; 58' or (3) a combination of
nondetachable shoulder harnesses, lap belts, and warning systems.582
According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), which oversees the
NHTSA's administration of the Act, the purpose of the option provision in
FMVSS 208 is to provide "sufficient latitude for industry to develop the
most effective systems" of occupant restraint rather than "mandating the
specific use of one device such as airbags. "583
Arguably, the current status of FMVSS 208 reflects an explicit
congressional and administrative policy that favors caution and flexibility in
the area of occupant restraints. This reading of FMVSS 208 has led several
courts to conclude that state tort claims should be preempted because such
claims would limit manufacturer choice, thus frustrating this explicit
congressional and administrative policy.5' However, some courts have
denied the existence of a policy that favors manufacturer choice. 85
Moreover, other courts have concluded that damage awards would not
compel manufacturers to install airbags and, therefore, would not deprive
manufacturers of any options provided by FMVSS 208.586
581. Id. § 571.208, S4.1.2.2.
582. Id. § 571.208, S4.1.2.3. See generally Theroff, supra note 191, at 584-85
(summarizing options under 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1988)).
583. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, at 28,997 (1984) (DOT announcement of final rule for
FMVSS 208).
584. E.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("[A]
state common law rule that would, in effect, remove the element of choice authorized in
Safety Standard 208 would frustrate the federal regulatory scheme."), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1065 (1990); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 714 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(adopting view that common-law damage awards destroy choices provided by FMVSS
208), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
853 (1990); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
("The prospect of common law damage awards for failing to chose [sic] the passive
restraint alternatives removes the element of choice expressly authorized in FMVSS 208
and further preserved by section 1410b(b)(2)."); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp.
1183, 1186 (D.S.D. 1987) (reasoning that successful damage claims would render
methods chosen by DOT for the development of occupant restraint systems moot); Baird
v. General Motors Corp., 654 F. Supp. 28, 32 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (stating that a decision
which removes the choice authorized by safety regulations will frustrate the regulatory
scheme); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 930-31 (Ala. 1989)
(Steagall, J., concurring) (same); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d
838, 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236 (1988).
585. See, e.g., Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 324 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that § 1410b does not ensure that passive restraints will remain
only an option); see also Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 425 (Ist Cir.
1988) (Selya, J., dissenting) ("One searches in vain for anything in the statute or the
standard intimating that the provision of choice is an 'objective of federal law.'"), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
586. See Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F. Supp. 1462, 1468 (D.N.M. 1988) ("This
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To some extent, FMVSS 208 appears to reflect a policy of manufactur-
er choice concerning airbags. In this respect, it is unlike other safety
standards promulgated under the Act. Presumably, Congress expects
manufacturers to consider such factors as effectiveness, cost, and technologi-
cal feasibility, when choosing an occupant safety system. If common-law
damage awards threaten to skew this process, they may interfere with an
important aspect of the Act's regulatory scheme. Hence, preemption may be
warranted in "no airbag" cases even if it is rejected in motor vehicle design
litigation generally.
C. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Section 136v(a) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA)1 allows states to regulate the sale or use of federally
registered pesticides as long as the states do not permit any sales or uses that
are prohibited by the Act. 88 However, section 136v(b) declares that no
state "shall. . .impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling
or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter." 89 Section 136v(b) clearly preempts state statutes and
administrative regulations that impose nonidentical labeling requirements on
pesticide manufacturers and sellers.5" Whether this provision also pre-
empts tort claims against pesticide manufacturers based on allegedly
inadequate warnings is less clear.
As a number of courts have observed, section 136v(b) does not
specifically mention common-law tort actions. 591 Instead, Congress used
the term "requirements" in that section to describe the type of state action
that the Act preempts. As previously discussed, the dictionary definition of
"requirements" is entirely consistent with statutory or administrative
Court . . . does not accept the premise that a state damage award 'compels' a
manufacturer to install passive restraints, and thereby frustrate [sic] the policy of
flexibility afforded by Standard 208."), rev'd sub nom. Kitts v. General Motors Corp.,
875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
587. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. m1 991).
588. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to
allow local governments, as well as states, to regulate pesticide users. Wisconsin Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2485 (1991).
589. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added).
590. Gleeson & Davidson, supra note 215, at 320.
591. E.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Arkansas Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters &
Rogers Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1474, 1481-82 (D. Colo. 1990), rev'd, 959 F.2d 158 (10th
Cir.), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S.
Ct. 314 (1992); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (W.D. Mo.
1989).
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commands. 92 Common-law tort doctrines, however, do not fit the defimi-
tion of "requirements" very well because they do not dictate or prohibit
behavior with the same degree of compulsion as do statutes and administra-
tive regulations."9 Consequently, the textual argument for preemption
initially seems weak.
The legislative history of FIFRA is also ambiguous about federal
preemption of tort claims. 94 It indicates that Congress intended to vest the
federal government with extensive powers over the manufacture, labeling,
and use of pesticides. 5 Section 136v(b) in particular was intended to
establish the federal government's regulatory primacy over pesticide
labeling. One House Committee Report declared: "In dividing the responsi-
bility between States and the Federal Government for the management of an
effective pesticide program, the Committee has adopted language which is
intended to completely preempt State authority in regard to labeling and
packaging."596 However, nothing in the legislative history indicates that
Congress considered state tort law tantamount to state regulation of
labeling.
597
As in most product preemption cases, the main issue is whether damage
awards are functionally equivalent to statutory or administrative commands.
Some courts have concluded that because of its coercive effect, tort liability
is a "back door" form of regulation and should be treated, for purposes of
federal preemption, the same as any other form of state regulation. 98
However, other courts have found that tort liability does not compel
behavior in the same manner as statutes or administrative regulations
because manufacturers can elect to pay damage awards instead of changing
their labeling.5 9
The closeness of this issue makes it desirable to look at contemporary
values and policies. The first policy to consider is the protection of trade
592. See supra text accompanying notes 490-494.
593. See supra text accompanying notes 490-494.
594. But see Gleeson & Davidson, supra note 215, at 319 ("FIFRA's legislative
history amply demonstrates that Congress intended to pre-empt all state regulation, other
than through FIFRA, of pesticides and the pesticide industry.") (emphasis added).
595. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
("FIFRA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to establish a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme .. "), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct.
3020 (1992).
596. H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
597. Several congressional reports give a section-by-section analysis of FIFRA, but
do little more than paraphrase the Act's preemption provision. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092, 4128; S.
REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993,
4021; H.R. REP. No. 511, supra note 596, at 64.
598. See cases cited supra note 253.
599. See cases cited supra note 252.
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and commerce. One practical effect of concentrating regulatory authority
over pesticide labeling in one federal agency is the achievement of consistent
and uniform labeling practices. Uniform regulatory standards reduce
production costs for manufacturers and make it easier for them to sell
products in a national market.' This argument has led some courts and
commentators to conclude that label uniformity is not merely a beneficial
side effect of FIFRA, but rather an avowed purpose of the Act. They
maintain that tort liability should be preempted because it constitutes a threat
to this uniformity goal."I
However, neither the statute nor its legislative history expressly
identifies uniformity of labeling as a legislative goal. The only textual
reference to uniformity is in the heading to section 136v(b)-"Uniformi-
ty"-which Congress added in 1988 without changing the language of the
preemption provision itself.' Also, nothing in the statute or in EPA
regulations requires uniform labeling if different manufacturers make the
same product.' 3 Finally, even if uniformity is a legislative goal, tort
actions do not destroy uniformity because only the EPA can approve or
modify pesticide labeling.'
As in most preemption cases, federalism values support a policy of
judicial deference to traditional state interests unless Congress mandates
otherwise.' 5 Since neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that
600. See Mary Lee A. Howarth, Comment, Preemption and Punitive Damages: The
Conflict Continues Under FIFRA, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1301, 1324-25 (1988).
601. See cases cited supra note 255; Gleeson & Davidson, supra note 215, at 320
("Both the House and the Senate recognized the need for federal pre-emption on labeling
in order to effect the stated policy of national uniformity desired by Congress.");
Timothy J. Kuester, Comment, FIFRA as an Affirmative Defense: Pre-emption of
Common-Law Tort Claims of Inadequate Labeling, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 1119, 1136
(1992) (arguing that uniformity in labeling is an objective of FIFRA).
602. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
603. Arkansas Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers Inc., 748 F. Supp.
1474, 1482 (D. Colo. 1990), rev'd, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), vacated sub nom.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992). Under
FIFRA, every manufacturer drafts a warning label for each product it markets and
submits the label for EPA approval. Consequently, two manufacturers of the same
product could use different labels as long as they obtained prior EPA approval. Cox v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
604. See infra notes 615-618 and accompanying text.
605. E.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) ("[]n
defining the scope of the Act's preemption provision, it is necessary to bear in mind ...
the circumspect view courts must take of a claim that Congress has preempted states
from exercising their traditional police powers on behalf of their citizens."), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (following Ferebee's view that preemption of state law requires the clear intent of
Congress).
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Congress intended to preempt state tort law, a finding of preemption would
be contrary to federalist principles.w6
On the other hand, the policy of deferring to agency decisionmaking
favors preemption. The EPA's regulatory authority over pesticide production
and use is very comprehensive,' perhaps even excluding tort liability
doctrines." °8 However, this "occupation of the field" argument is weak-
ened by the states' significant role in FIFRA's regulatory scheme. 69
An additional consideration favoring preemption is that the EPA is
more competent than juries to evaluate the risks of pesticides.6"' Finally,
as the court declared in Papas v. Upjohn Co.,611 Congress has given the
EPA exclusive authority to balance socially competing interests when
deciding whether to register a product.62 According to Papas, because
labeling decisions are part of the registration process, juries should not be
allowed to second-guess EPA decisions about the adequacy of pesticide
labeling.
613
To assess the validity of the Papas court's argument, one must consider
the probable impact of jury verdicts on the regulatory process. Ordinarily,
the EPA would not be a party to a tort action between private parties and,
therefore, would not be bound by a state-law finding that the warning on a
particular label is inadequate. Furthermore, pesticide manufacturers cannot
place additional material on their product labels without EPA approval.
614
Thus, the EPA would retain its exclusive power over product labeling even
if common-law tort actions were allowed.615
606. See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The
federalism issued [is] too important to warrant foreclosing recovery to an injured party
on a questionable theory of implied preemption.").
607. See Howarth, supra note 600, at 1305-06.
608. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
("[W]e hold that the federal government has occupied the entire field of labeling
regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law, even by means of
state common law tort actions."), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct.
3020 (1992). Contra Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (V.D.
Mo. 1989) ("[The scheme created by FIFRA is not 'so pervasive' or the federal interest
'so dominant' as to demonstrate an intent to preempt all state law claims."); Roberts, 702
F. Supp. at 199 ("FIFRA regulations are not so comprehensive as to occupy the entire
field.").
609. E.g., Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1543 ("[T]he fact that Congress has chosen to allow
the states to regulate the use of pesticides approved by the EPA means that states retain
the lesser power to control the use of such pesticides by requiring that at least some of
the resulting injuries be compensated.").
610. See Howarth, supra note 600, at 1323.
611. 926 F.2d 1019.
612. Id. at 1022-23.
613. Id. at 1025-26.
614. See Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
615. Of course, a manufacturer faced with substantial tort liability who could not get
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The Papas court also claimed that if injured parties recovered damages
on the basis of inadequate warnings, manufacturers "would likely press the
EPA to change its labeling requirements to reflect the jury awards so as to
free the manufacturer from future tort liability for the same jury-found
'inadequacies' in labeling."616 According to the court, this "outside pres-
sure on the regulatory process would hinder the development of an orderly,
systematic, and uniform nationwide labeling scheme."617
Although damage awards against pesticide manufacturers would likely
induce them to petition the EPA to approve new labeling, it is difficult to
view this effect as an interference with the regulatory process. The EPA,
like other regulatory agencies, is constantly besieged by requests from
consumers, manufacturers, environmentalists, and others. As long as the
EPA retains the power to act according to its best judgment, tort liability
should pose no real threat to the EPA's regulatory authority.
618
As in most product preemption cases, a finding against preemption in
pesticide cases appears to advance public health and safety. Public safety is
one of FIFRA's most important statutory objectives. 6 9 As the Ferebee
the EPA to change the labeling on its product would be placed in an unenviable position.
As the Ferebee court noted, compliance with both state and federal law is not impossible
because the manufacturer can comply with both "by continuing to use the EPA-approved
label and by simultaneously paying damages to successful tort plaintiffs." Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984). However, the court apparently ignored the inequity of placing a product
manufacturer in such a dilemma. See id. at 1543.
616. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1026.
617. Id.
618. An important difference exists between pesticide cases and cigarette or airbag
cases. In the cigarette labeling cases, several courts have implied that tort liability would
compromise the achievement of uniform labeling because the potential liability would
induce manufacturers to place additional material on their labeling. See Pennington v.
Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989), called into doubt by Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aft'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), called
into doubt by Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608. Likewise, in the airbag cases a number of
courts have concluded that tort liability would pressure manufacturers to install airbags
instead of allowing manufacturers to choose from among the various options allowed by
FMVSS 208. See cases cited supra note 213.
However, in cigarette and airbag cases, the courts were concerned with the effect
tort liability would have on manufacturers because the regulatory schemes in question
allow manufacturers some control over the regulated area. That is not the case with
labeling decisions under FIFRA. Pesticide manufacturers can petition the EPA to
authorize a change in labeling, but they cannot change EPA-approved labeling on their
own initiative. See Cox, 704 F. Supp. at 87. Moreover, since FIFRA does not allow
manufacturers to choose not to label products, no regulatory policy in favor of choice is
violated if tort claims are allowed.
619. According to the Senate Committee that drafted amendments to FIFRA, the
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court observed, products liability also promotes safety in various ways. The
threat of tort liability encourages manufacturers to discover potential
pesticide-related risks and to reduce them, when possible, by improving
product design or providing better warnings.62 In addition, private
litigation may expose pesticide-related risks that were previously unknown
to the EPA or the general public.62' Finally, successful tort actions may
cause manufacturers to request that better warnings be placed on pesticide
labels; alternatively, common-law suits may induce the EPA to require
improved warnings on pesticide products. 6' Thus, imposition of tort
liability on manufacturers of defectively labeled products seems to be
completely consistent with consumer safety goals in general, and with
FIFRA's statutory goals in particular.
The compensation principle also supports a finding of no preemption.
Admittedly, FIFRA is concerned with allocating risks and benefits in an
efficient manner rather than achieving compensatory objectives.6' Thus,
the EPA Administrator must consider both the risks and the benefits of a
pesticide before allowing it to be registered.624 Similarly, before approving
proposed labeling, the EPA must determine that the information included is
adequate to protect the public and the environment.' s Even though FIFRA
gives the EPA Administrator the exclusive right to determine the level of
acceptable risk for purposes of pesticide registration and labeling, the Act
says nothing about who should bear these risks. Arguably, therefore, the
amended Act "provides for the more complete regulation of pesticides in order to provide
for the protection of man and his environment and the enhancement of the beauty of the
world around him." S. REP. No. 838, supra note 597, at 3, reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3995; see also Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d
331, 335 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The basic purpose of the statute [is] to regulate the labeling
of such products to provide purchasers with assurance of effectiveness and safety when
used in compliance with the manufacturer's instructions."); Fisher v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("The principle [sic] purpose of FIFRA
is to protect consumers by keeping unhealthy or unsafe pesticides off the market and by
preventing deceptive labeling.").
620. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
621. See id. at 1541.
622. Id.
623. "Pesticides therefore have important environmental effects, both beneficial and
deleterious. Their wise control based on a careful balancing of benefit versus risk to
determine what is best for man is essential."S. REP. No. 838, supra note 597, at 4,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3996.
624. The Senate Report also declared: "In each case the Administrator must take into
account all relevant factors and decide whether it is better for man and the environment
that this product be registered." Id. pt. 2, at 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4033.
625. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (1lth Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
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states should be free to make decisions about risk distribution as long as
they do not interfere with the EPA's risk-benefit decisions.626
In summary, nothing in the text or legislative history of FIFRA
suggests that Congress intended to preempt tort liability. Furthermore, no
evidence exists that state-law damage awards undermine the purposes of the
Act. Finally, refusal to preempt state tort claims is consistent with a number
of contemporary values and policies.
D. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
1. Pharmaceutical Products in General
Neither the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)627 nor its
companion legislation, the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 628 expressly
preempts state-law tort claims.629 The FDCA's legislative history is also
silent on the preemption issue."3 Therefore, contemporary values and
policies must be examined with particular care.
Several values and policies are relevant to the question of FDCA
preemption of state tort law. As in the previously discussed cases, the policy
of promoting trade and commerce provides a possible justification for
preemption. Tort liability affects the cost, and in some cases the availability,
of pharmaceutical products." 1 On the other hand, uniformity of product
labeling may reduce production costs and eliminate some of the uncertainty
associated with tort liability.63 2 Furthermore, the FDA has apparently
adopted a policy of promoting uniform labeling standards for drugs.633
Because regulation of health and safety is a traditional area of state
concern,61 4 implied preemption would seem to be inconsistent with
626. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541 ("Even if [the manufacturer] could not alter the
label, [the state] could decide that, as between a manufacturer and an injured party, the
manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those injuries that could have
been prevented with a more detailed label than that approved by the EPA.").
627. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991).
628. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300aaa-13 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
629. Jennie Clarke, Comment, Federal Preemption: A Vaccine Manufacturer's
Defense, 56 UMKC L. REV. 515, 531 (1988).
630. Landen, supra note 259, at 112.
631. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products, supra note 126, at 753-55; see Note,
supra note 264, at 782.
632. See Del Giorno, supra note 266, at 639.
633. See 50 Fed. Reg. 51,403 (1985) ("FDA has a well-established policy of
promoting uniformity in the area of labeling."); see also Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F.
Supp. 993, 999 (E.D. Tex. 1986) ("Drug labeling is an area where national uniformity
is to be promoted, and constitutes a dominant federal interest."), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536
(5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988); Naile, supra note 278, at 691.
634. Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Minn. 1989); see
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federalism values. However, the federal government also has a longstanding
interest in the promotion of public health, including drug safety. Congress
enacted the first federal drug safety statute almost a century-and-a-half
ago,"3 and the federal government has maintained a significant regulatory
presence in this area since the turn of the century.636 Consequently, the
argument that preemption is contrary to federalist values is less persuasive
when applied to the FDCA than when raised in connection with other
product safety legislation.
Initially, the principle of deference to agency decisionmaking appears
to support preemption. The FDA has the expertise to review the large
amounts of scientific and technical data necessary to make a proper decision
about drug safety.637 In contrast, courts and juries possess little or no
ability to evaluate scientific evidence.638 Therefore, the FDA's judgment
on drug safety issues should be authoritative.639
However, this idealized view of FDA decisionmaking is not universally
accepted for several reasons. First, like many other federal agencies, the
FDA has experienced budget cutbacks and staff reductions over the past
decade." 0 This lack of resources limits the FDA's ability to obtain
information about drug risks from independent sources and forces the
agency to rely heavily on information provided by drug manufacturers."
Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); see also Foote, supra note 451, at 1433; Westerfield,
supra note 461, at 270-71.
635. See Import Drugs Act, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848). For a discussion of this
statute, see Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and
Labeling, 36 FooD DRUG COsM. L.J. 420, 422-24 (1981).
636. Comprehensive federal drug safety regulation began with the enactment of the
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. For a discussion of the 1906
Act, see Thomas W. Christopher, Food and Drug Legislation in the United States:
Introductory Comments on Its History, 24 Sw. L.J. 403, 403-04 (1970). For a brief
history of federal drug regulation since 1906, see Landen, supra note 259, at 96-97.
637. See Landen, supra note 259, at 99-101, 116-17; Naile, supra note 278, at 694;
see Walsh & Klein, supra note 268, at 192.
638. Walsh & Klein, supra note 268, at 193; see Note, supra note 264, at 780-82; Del
Giorno, supra note 266, at 630.
639. Landen, supra note 259, at 120 ("Where medical opinions differ, the FDA's
judgment about drug safety should clearly prevail."); cf. Edmondson v. International
Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (opining that the safety of
medical devices is a problem best solved by medical professionals rather than by lay
persons in tort litigation).
640. For example, budget restraints have resulted in the loss of about 2000 FDA
employees since 1980. Bruce A. Silverglade, Preemption-The Consumer Viewpoint, 45
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 143, 144 (1990).
641. Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
("Because of the myriad drugs submitted for licensing, as well as its relatively limited
resources, the FDA must depend on would-be manufacturers to perform the bulk of the
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In addition, the FDA does not have the power to force manufacturers to
make better products. In Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, the court noted
that the FDA can consider a new product or design only after a manufac-
turer comes forward with a proposal 2 Thus, even though pharmaceutical
products are licensed by the FDA, they may not be the safest products
potentially available.6"
On first impression, preemption does not seem to comport very well
with the FDCA's health and safety goals. Drug safety is, of course, one of
the Act's most important objectives," but tort law also encourages
manufacturers to provide safer drugs.6" Because preemption displaces
state tort law and thereby lessens the incentive to produce safer products,
preemption seems inconsistent with the promotion of health and safety. 6
Nevertheless, tort liability has the potential to undermine product
safety, at least when warnings are concerned. According to some commenta-
tors, fear of potential tort liability may cause drug manufacturers to include
excessive material on product labels, thereby impairing the effectiveness of
work involved in the procurement of a license."); see Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 851 F.2d
1536, 1542 (5th Cir.) (explaining that the FDA is a "passive" agency, largely dependent
upon manufacturer-applicants for information), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir.
1988).
642. Hurley, 851 F.2d at 1540.
643. See White v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 757 (Ohio 1988) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If a drug manufacturer had come to the FDA
with an improved drug, the FDA would have decided whether to license it. However,
if a drug manufacturer had elected not to improve its drug, the FDA would not have
required that the drug manufacturer attempt to make it safer."). This may explain why
many courts have concluded that FDA regulations are usually nothing more than
minimum standards. E.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F:2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989);
Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1152 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (D.N.J. 1988).
644. See Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th
Cir.) ("The overall goal of the PHSA and FDCA is the safety of drugs and biologic
products."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp.
993, 1004 (E.D. Tex. 1986) ("[A]nother purpose [of the FDCA] was the protection of
the health of the citizens of the United States"), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.),
superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
645. MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.N.M. 1987); see also
Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products, supra note 126, at 745-49 (discussing the
allocative efficiency rationale for holding manufacturers strictly liable); cf Jones ex rel.
Jones v. Lederle Lab., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the
essence of a successful products liability claim is that the defendant could have marketed
a superior design).
646. See Wack v. Lederle Lab., 666 F. Supp. 123, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("For this
Court to deprive the plaintiffs of these theories of recovery would, in effect, grant
defendants immunity from liability for their alleged tortious conduct."); see also
Westerfield, supra note 461, at 283 (stating that preemption immunizes drug manufactur-
ers from liability for tortious conduct and removes incentive for improving products).
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warnings by creating an information overload and obscuring critical
information. 7 Additionally, tort liability threatens to defeat the FDA's
policy of "rational prescribing" by encouraging manufacturers to place
warnings on their products that exaggerate known risks or raise unwarranted
concerns about hypothetical or unproven risks. 64
Although these arguments raise legitimate concerns, they ignore the fact
that the FDA has complete control over the content of labeling. If the FDA
is concerned that unnecessary or misleading information on product labeling
undermines its regulatory policies, it can deny manufacturers' requests to
place additional warnings on their products.649 Furthermore, the FDA has
the power expressly to preempt state tort law if the agency concludes that
tort liability frustrates its regulatory objectives. 50 The FDA's failure to
expressly preempt state common law suggests that the agency does not
believe that preemption is necessary. If the agency does not perceive a
danger to its regulatory program, there is no reason for a court to find
one.
651
Compensation policies also militate against a finding of preemption.
Tort liability provides a means of compensating injured parties; 2 howev-
er, the preemption doctrine immunizes manufacturers from liability and
leaves victims without a remedy.' Therefore, courts should be cautious
about destroying state-law remedies in the absence of strong evidence that
Congress intended to preempt state remedies. 4
647. Clarke, supra note 629, at 537; Del Giorno, supra note 266, at 651-52.
648. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 238 (1986); Walsh &
Klein, supra note 268, at 187-88.
649. See Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
650. Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1338-39 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.N.M. 1987). The FDA has
occasionally promulgated regulations that purported expressly to preempt state law. See,
e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 8180, at 8181 (1986) (aspirin products); 47 Fed. Reg. 54,750, at
54,756-57 (1982) (over-the-counter drugs for pregnant or nursing women); 47 Fed. Reg.
50,442, at 50,447-48 (1982) (tamper-resistant packaging).
651. Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Carter G. Phillips, Federal Preemption: A
Comment on Regulatory Preemption after Hillsborough County, 18 URB. LAw. 589, 604
(1986).
652. Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also
Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products, supra note 126, at 749-50 (discussing the loss-
spreading rationale for retaining state tort law).
653. See Tarallo v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D.S.C. 1988)
("[P]reemption is less likely if its imposition leaves the plaintiff without available legal
means of redress.").
654. See Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Md. 1989) ("'It
is difficult to believe that Congress, would, without comment, remove all means of
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.'") (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-
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2. DPT Vaccine
Because the FDA regulates DPT and other vaccines under the same
statutory authority that empowers the agency to regulate chemical drugs, the
preemption issues should be similar. However, several factors are unique to
preemption analysis of vaccine regulations. First, the federal government has
comprehensively regulated vaccine production. Second, the federal
government has long maintained a policy of supporting public vaccination
programs. A final consideration is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986 (NCVIA). 6"
The FDA regulates vaccines and other biological products more
comprehensively than drugs or other nonbiological products. 56 The
comprehensiveness of this regulatory scheme suggests that the FDA has
occupied the field of vaccine regulation, even though the agency has not
done so with pharmaceutical products regulation in general.5 7 The force
of this argument, however, is weakened by the Supreme Court's admonition
against finding preemption based solely on comprehensive regulation.65 8
The longstanding federal policy of protecting the public against
communicable childhood diseases also supports preemption. 659 For many
years, the federal government has provided financial support and technical
assistance to state and local vaccination programs.' The NCVIA and the
Vaccine Compensation Amendments of 198766 provide additional evi-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1293, 1300 (D. Minn. 1988) ("If Congress wants to take the extraordinary step
of giving drug manufacturers immunity from personal tort actions, it would expressly
state such intentions whether by statute or legislative history."); see also Westerfield,
supra note 461, at 282-83 (concluding that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort
law).
655. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -33 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
656. Naile, supra note 278, at 688. The FDA requires manufacturers to test each lot
of vaccine according to specific procedures formulated by the agency. The manufacturer
must then submit the test results, along with vaccine samples from each lot, to the FDA
for review before the vaccine is released for sale. Labeling requirements for vaccines are
also comprehensive. Id. at 688-89.
657. Id. at 689.
658. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1985). But see Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 999, 1003-04 (E.D. Tex.
1986), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
659. See Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
660. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) provides public health advisors to state
and local health departments. The CDC also administers a federal grant program
authorized by the Vaccination Assistance Act of 1962, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 247b (1988). Under this program, the federal government purchases vaccine directly
from the manufacturers and provides it to state health departments at reduced cost for
distribution in local public health clinics. Naile, supra note 278, at 691-92.
661. Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4301-07, 101 Stat. 1330-221 to -225 (codified as
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dence of a substantial federal commitment to the safety and availability of
vaccines.662
According to some commentators, the prospect of tort liability has
caused vaccine manufacturers to leave the market 3 or raise their prices
substantially.' Accordingly, tort liability arguably conflicts with the
federal policy of ensuring a reliable supply of vaccine.
The final factor to consider is the effect of the NCVIA and the Vaccine
Compensation Amendments. These statutes created a compensation scheme
for children who are injured by certain vaccines.' However, these
statutes do not prohibit injured parties from bringing state tort actions
against vaccine manufacturers.' Because the federal statutes were
concerned with ensuring that vaccine supplies would remain adequate to
meet public health needs, the tacit acceptance of tort liability for vaccine
manufacturers suggests that Congress did not believe tort liability would
interfere with this objective.6 7
The legislative history of the NCVIA also suggests that Congress
assumed vaccine manufacturers were subject to tort liability in the past and
would continue to be liable in the future. For example, a House Report
declared: "Currently, vaccine-injured persons can seek recovery for their
damages only through the civil tort system or through a settlement
arrangement with the vaccine manufacturer."" Another part of the Report
stated: "Vaccine-injured persons will now have an appealing alternative to
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11 to -34 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
662. See Naile, supra note 278, at 700.
663. See David & Jalilian-Marian, supra note 306, at 188 (reporting that manufactur-
ers threatened to cease or limit production of DPT vaccine because of the fear of tort
liability); Richard A. Epstein, The TemporalDimension in TortLaw, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1204 (1986) (stating that manufacturers of pertussis vaccine withdrew their
products from the market because they did not think that they could recover litigation and
liability costs); Neraas, supra note 322, at 160 (stating cost and uncertainty of defending
claims created disincentive for manufacturers to continue production of vaccines).
664. The prospect of tort liability has caused a dramatic increase in the price of DPT
vaccine. In 1982, manufacturers charged 11 cents ($0.11) per dose for DPT vaccine. By
1986, the price had risen to $11.40 per dose. Reportedly, manufacturers used $8.00 of
this increase to provide for an insurance reserve against future tort liability. See Tim
Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should All Prescription
Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707, 718 (1989).
665. For a general discussion of these statutes, see Dark, supra note 276, at 843-50;
Schwartz & Mahshigian, Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, supra note 322, at 389-93;
Sturges, supra note 322, at 938-46.
666. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
667. See Abbot ex rel. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113-14
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
668. H. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6347.
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the tort system."' These observations indicate that Congress did not
expect the FDA's DPT regulations to preempt state tort law.670
Thus, it appears that Congress and the FDA have treated vaccines
differently from other pharmaceutical products. In particular, the federal
government has developed a policy of ensuring that adequate supplies of
vaccine will be available to protect against childhood diseases. Arguably,
design defect claims against DPT manufacturers should be preempted
because such claims threaten the availability of this vaccine. However, both
the FDA's failure to expressly preempt such claims, and Congress's refusal
to preempt tort claims under the NCVIA, greatly undermine the case for
preemption. Although the question is close, the courts should continue to
reject preemption in DPT cases until Congress or the FDA acts on the
preemption issue.
E. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
Congress amended the FDCA by enacting the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA),671 which gave the FDA regulatory authority
over medical devices. Unlike the FDCA, the MDA contains an express
preemption statement in section 360k(a).672 This provision declares that no
state or political subdivision may establish "any requirement" differing from
or in addition to any FDA safety or effectiveness standard applicable to a
medical device regulated by the Amendments."3 Notably, section 360k(a)
applies to FDA regulations promulgated under the MDA, but does not
extend to regulations issued pursuant to other provisions of the FDCA.
Congress chose the term "requirement"' to describe the type of state
regulatory action that section 360k(a) prohibits. Both the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and FIFRA contain the same expression in
their preemption provisions. As previously discussed, the term "require-
ment" connotes a command or mandate that gives the regulated party no
choice but to comply.674 Since damage awards do not involve this degree
of compulsion, perhaps Congress did not intend section 360k(a) to preempt
common-law tort liability.67 However, common-law damage awards are
669. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367.
670. See, e.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1114; McMillan ex rel Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674
F. Supp. 530, 533-34 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Graham ex. rel. Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666
F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (D. Kan. 1987).
671. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-1 (1988
& Supp. III 1991)).
672. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988).
673. Id. The text of § 360k(a) is set forth supra note 332.
674. See supra text accompanying notes 490-494.
675. Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md. 1989) ("Congress
intended the term requirement to refer to legislative and administrative 'programs'
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supposed to have a deterrent effect on product manufacturers who might
place defective products on the market.676 Hence, it would not be unrea-
sonable for a court to treat tort liability as a "requirement" for purposes of
preemption. 677
The legislative history of the Amendments does not indicate whether
Congress intended to preempt state tort law. A House Report on the
proposed Bill described some existing state legislative programs and
indicated that they would be preempted unless the FDA granted them an
exemption.67 However, the House Report says nothing about the Bill's
preemptive effect on state tort law.679 This legislative silence is strong
evidence that Congress did not intend section 360k(a) to preempt state tort
law.
A brief examination of contemporary values and policies indicates that
preemption is consistent with some values and policies, but apparently
inconsistent with others. The policy of protecting interstate commerce
supports the goal of uniform, national regulation of medical devices by the
FDA.68' However, federalism values caution against a finding of preemp-
tion when it displaces the traditional state interests protecting of public
health and safety. 61 Although some courts have expressed doubts about
governing the sale and distribution of devices, not to state common law."); Kociemba v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988) ("MIft is doubtful that the
term 'requirement' as used in section 360k is broad enough to encompass an action
pursued under state tort law").
676. See Gary J. Highland, Note, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict
Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 814-16 (1979).
677. See Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.S.C. 1987)
("Plaintiff's common law tort claim alleging 'inadequate warnings' seeks, by definition,
to establish a tort labeling requirement which could be different from or in addition to
the existing and applicable FDA requirement."); Edmondson v. International Playtex,
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("A requirement imposed by a State
Court is no less a requirement than one imposed by a State legislature."). This
conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's finding in Cipollone that the term
"requirement" in the Cigarette Labeling Act was sufficiently broad to preempt expressly
some tort claims. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992).
678. H. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1976).
679. See Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Minn. 1989)
("There is ... nothing in the legislative history of the MDA indicating that Congress
intended section [360k(a)] to preempt the application of the remedies available under state
tort law."); Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 668 ("The House Report demonstrates a clear
concern with statutory programs administered by States and localities and never even
hints to inclusion of state common law.").
680. Lindquist, 721 F. Supp. at 1063; see also Landen, supra note 259, at 114-15
(discussing the goal of uniformity in the labeling and design of drugs).
681. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718
(1985).
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the reliability of FDA decisionmaking, 6" the policy of deferring to agency
judgment supports preemption.683 Finally, both consumer safety and
compensation policies favor the retention of state tort law.
Based on these factors, a court might reasonably conclude that the
MDA does not preempt state tort law. However, an additional factor may
tip the balance in favor of preemption. Unlike the FDCA, which has no
preemption provision, section 360k(a) of the Amendments expressly
preempts state requirements." Furthermore, the FDA has specifically
interpreted this section to preempt state tort law as well as legislative and
administrative regulations.6" Although one might claim that section
360k(a) does not give the FDA the power to preempt state tort law, 66 the
holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 6" requires courts to defer to an agency's interpretation if the interpre-
tation is based on a permissible construction of the statute in question.88
Because the FDA's interpretation of section 360k(a) is apparently permissi-
ble, the courts should defer to the FDA's judgment and rule that tort claims
against manufacturers who comply with the requirements of the MDA are
preempted.
68 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Part V offers the following conclusions: (1) The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act should not be interpreted to preempt failure-
to-warn claims under state tort law; (2) In general, safety standards issued
pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act should not
be given preemptive effect. However, perhaps FMVSS 208, which concerns
682. See supra cases cited note 641.
683. See Edmondson v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1574 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) ("[Federal regulation of medical devices] is basically a medical problem, and
one that would appear to best be resolved by medical professionals rather than by lay
persons in the context of tort litigation."); cf. Landen, supra note 259, at 120 (stating
that the FDA's judgment about drug safety should prevail when medical opinions differ).
684. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988).
685. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1992). The text of this section is set forth supra note 333.
686. See Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 668 (D. Md. 1989) ("To
the extent that the FDA's inclusion of the words 'court decision' in its implementing
regulations suggests otherwise, the FDA regulation contradicts Congressional intent and
is not based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
687. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
688. Id. at 842-45.
689. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1989);
Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1062-63 (D. Minn. 1989); Meyer v.
International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (D.N.J. 1988); Rinehart v.
International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Stewart v.
International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (D.S.C. 1987).
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occupant safety, should preempt state tort law because Congress intended to
give automobile manufacturers the right to choose devices other than airbags
to satisfy occupant restraint requirements; (3) The preemption provision in
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act should not be
interpreted to preclude damage claims against pesticide manufacturers; (4)
Although FDA regulations are comprehensive, they should not preempt
common-law tort doctrines; and (5) The Medical Device Amendments'
preemption section applies to state tort law because the FDA has expressed
a clear intention to preempt common-law claims under this provision.
Most of these conclusions are consistent with the courts' results, with
two major exceptions. This Article suggests that the Cigarette Labeling Act
should not preempt state failure-to-warn claims; however, the United States
Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.6" concluded otherwise.
In addition, this Article concludes that Congress did not intend FIFRA to
preempt state tort law; however, the courts are evenly split on this issue.
What do these results suggest about the practical reasoning approach?
Do they indicate that courts which use this approach will generally uphold
tort liability in product preemption cases? The answer would seem to be
"yes," because many of the contemporary values and policies discussed
earlier promote the same interests as tort law. However, one must remember
that each interpreter approaches a statutory text from a different perspective
or horizon. This author concludes that preemption is not appropriate in
cigarette labeling cases, at least in part, because he values federalism,
safety, and compensation more highly than commercial convenience or
agency deference. Another interpreter might value these factors differently
and reach a different conclusion.69' The value of the Eskridge-Frickey
approach lies not in producing more determinate results, but in ensuring that
courts which employ the model will not ignore or marginalize important
values when interpreting statutes.
The Author does not intend to suggest that state tort law is inherently
superior to federal product safety legislation. Although various factors weigh
against preemption in the cases discussed above, one of the most significant
considerations is the absence of a clear statement of intent by either
Congress or the regulatory agency to preempt state tort law. Many situations
exist in which federal agencies can make better decisions about product
safety than can courts or juries. It is entirely appropriate for federal agencies
to invoke their preemptive power in these situations, as long as they do so
clearly and unequivocally.
Finally, federal safety standards play an important role in products
liability litigation even when they do not preempt state tort doctrines. In
appropriate cases, compliance with federal safety standards should create a
690. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
691. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 346-47.
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rebuttable presumption that the product is not defective or that a warning is
adequate. 6' In this way, federal product safety regulations and state tort
liability rules can complement and reinforce each other.
Both federal law and common-law tort principles play a major role in
the operation of products liability law.6" One hopes this useful partnership
will continue in the future. Much of the friction that typically arises between
these two systems can be avoided if Congress and the appropriate federal
agencies make known with greater clarity their intentions. Until then, courts
should exercise their interpretive functions in a responsible and principled
manner.
692. See, e.g., Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability, supra note 465, at 632 (stating
that manufacturers should not be liable for product designs that meet federal standards
unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the standards were
"inadequate to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from
unreasonable risks of injury or damage"); f. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW 83-84 (1980) (suggesting that compliance with regulatory standard should
be conclusive unless plaintiff gives reasons why it should not).
693. Cf. T. Schwartz, supra note 466, at 1161-63 (discussing the interaction of state
tort law and federal safety regulations).
